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Note
A Broad View of Broadview Solar: How FERC’s
Whiplash-Inducing Orders Expand the Scope of
PURPA
Christopher Cerny*
Broadview Solar, LLC, a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) order issued on September 1, 2020,
dramatically reversed forty years of agency precedent.1 The
order fundamentally changed how the Commission would
interpret the legal megawatt (MW) capacity limitation of
qualifying facility (QF) status for small energy production
facilities under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA).2 PURPA, passed in 1978 as part of a sweeping energy
policy initiative known as the National Energy Act, aimed to
promote energy conservation and the adoption of renewable
energy.3 To achieve these goals, PURPA created a statutory
program for non-utility-owned “small power production
facilities” to sell energy produced from renewable energy sources
to utility companies at favorable rates based on the utility’s
avoided costs.4 FERC’s decision in Broadview Solar threatened
the viability of the QF program by limiting the capacity of these
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1. Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194 (2020).
2. Id. at ¶ 62,275–77; Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95–617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15,
16, 42, and 43 U.S.C.).
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018).
4. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3 (2018); Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel,
Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Distributed Generation and Net
Metering, 41 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 43, 53 (2017).
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small power production facilities and with it removing a
powerful tool that incorporates renewable energy on the grid.
However, in a turn as dramatic as its initial decision, FERC
issued a new order that set aside its Broadview Solar order on
March 19, 2021 and reestablished the long-standing
interpretation.5
PURPA defines a “small power production facility” as “an
eligible solar, wind, waste, or geothermal facility, or a facility
which . . . has a power production capacity which, together with
any other facilities located at the same site . . . , is not greater
than 80 megawatts.”6 FERC acted to support the goals of
PURPA when it determined a facility’s net capacity—the
amount of power a facility actually sends to the utility after
subtracting all the facility’s own usage—would be the measure
of capacity in terms of the eighty MW limitation in 1981 as a
means of expanding QF eligibility.7 Broadview Solar eradicated
this net capacity interpretation and instead imposed a
determination based on component generation capacity—or the
amount a component part of the facility is capable of producing—
rather than the system as a whole.8 FERC’s subsequent order on
rehearing, which this Note will refer to as Broadview Rehearing,
restored the net capacity interpretation and clarified that this is
the appropriate methodology going forward.9
FERC’s Broadview Rehearing order does more, however,
than course correct and return to the prior basis for QF
eligibility. FERC went further and affirmatively included on-site
battery storage infrastructure as part of a QF. This seemingly
small decision will have major positive ramifications for new
renewable energy facilities seeking QF status utilizing battery
storage. Renewable energy is the fastest growing energy source
for electricity generation.10 However, due to the intermittent
5. Broadview Solar, LLC, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2021) (to avoid confusion,
this Note will refer to the second Broadview Solar decision as Broadview
Rehearing).
6. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A) (2018).
7. See Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17 FERC ¶ 61,231, 61,445 (1981)
(facilitating greater inclusion of renewable facilities by adopting the net
capacity approach in recognition of the economic forces that could otherwise
frustrate the purpose of PURPA).
8. See Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,276 (2020).
9. Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC at ¶ 61,800–01.
10. Renewable Energy, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
https://www.c2es.org/content/renewable-
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nature of many forms of renewable generation,11 it is difficult to
obtain consistent, baseload electricity.12 But as the technology
behind battery storage becomes more advanced and efficient, the
ability to deploy it to provide constant power from otherwise
variable renewable sources such as wind and solar makes it an
important component of these facilities.13
This Note articulates how FERC’s decision in Broadview
Solar was a legislative overreach by the Commission, pushing
the boundaries of agency power at the expense of creating
barriers to increasing the amount of carbon-free energy on the
electric grid. This Note then looks at FERC’s decision to revert
to the previously established interpretation, why this issue in
particular lent itself to reconsideration, and what this says about
FERC as an agency. Part I provides a background of the
National Energy Act, PURPA, and the policy goals the
legislation aimed to achieve; the history of FERC’s capacity
interpretation and how it supported the policy goals of PURPA;
the current capabilities of renewable energy and battery storage
technology; and the two Broadview decisions. Part II situates the
Broadview Solar order in the historical interpretation of power
production capacity; provides an analysis of how the order could
have created enormous uncertainty in an area of formerly settled
law; addresses the troubling concerns the order raised with
regard to both due process and longstanding agency
interpretations; and argues that FERC made the correct decision
in Broadview Rehearing that will foster the development of
renewable energy and battery storage in parts of the United
States that will receive the most benefit. Finally, this Note
addresses the Broadview Saga as a whole,14 focusing on what
the initial order and the subsequent rehearing say about FERC’s
energy/#:~:text=Renewable%20energy%20is%20the%20fastest,wind%20power
%20(6.6%20percent) (last visited Dec. 6, 2020).
11. See Mohammed Yekini Suberu et al., Energy Storage Systems for
Renewable Energy Power Sector Integration and Mitigation of Intermittency, 35
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 499, 500 (2014).
12. C.f. id. Baseload electricity refers to “the minimum amount of electric
power . . . required over a given period of time at a steady rate.” Glossary, EIA,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=B (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
The generating equipment that provides baseload power generally operates
around the clock and at a constant rate of output. See id.
13. See Rich Glick & Matthew Christiansen, FERC and Climate Change,
40 ENERGY L.J. 1, 24 (2019).
14. This Note will refer to Broadview Solar and Broadview Rehearing
collectively as Broadview Saga.
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process, politicization, and responsiveness, as well as why there
is compelling justification to warrant the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit to uphold the order on
rehearing.15 Part III briefly concludes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT OF 1978
The United States faced a massive and unprecedented
energy crisis in the 1970s.16 This crisis was a remarkable
confluence of events that significantly altered the energy
landscape faster than the United States could react.17 The
nation increasingly utilized oil for electricity generation because
of the higher costs of coal and natural gas.18 When the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

15. Multiple parties have appealed the order on rehearing to the D.C.
Circuit. Broadview Solar, LLC, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2021), appeal docketed,
Solar Energy Industries v. FERC, No. 21-01126 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2021).
16. See Richard D. Lifset, A New Understanding of the American Energy
Crisis of the 1970s, 39 HIST. SOC. RSCH. 22, 37–38 (2014) (explaining that the
United States in the 1970s encountered three separate energy market events
that coincided to create a large-scale energy crisis).
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-543, at 73 (1977) (explaining how the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries oil embargo caused “oil prices
[to] quadruple[], sending the world economy into the worst recession since the
Great Depression”); MEG JACOBS, PANIC AT THE PUMP: THE ENERGY CRISIS AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE 1970S 33–35 (1st ed.
2016) (explaining that President Richard Nixon, in 1971, adopted price controls
to impose a wage and price freeze in a controversial effort to depress prices and
shore up the economy ahead of the 1972 election, which led President Nixon’s
landslide victory over Democratic candidate George McGovern, but also laid the
groundwork for the spike in gasoline prices during the decade that helped cause
a nation-wide energy panic); Julia Richardson & Robert Nordhaus, The
National Energy Act of 1978, 10 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 62, 62 (1995) (showing that
the United States imported more oil than it produced by the beginning of the
1970s, and foreign oil composed half of all U.S. consumption by 1977); James D.
Hamilton, Historical Oil Shocks 13–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 16790, 2011), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w
16790/w16790.pdf (explaining how the decrease in oil output by the maturation
of Texas oil fields, the end of the Bretton-Woods system of U.S. dollar to gold
conversions, dramatic price-of-goods inflation, and the OPEC oil embargo led to
petroleum shortages in the United States).
18. See Charles Issawi, The 1973 Oil Crisis and After, 1 J. POST KEYNESIAN
ECON. 3, 11 (1978) (discussing how the stagnation in coal production, coupled
with underdeveloped nuclear and natural gas resources, led the United States
to increasingly rely on foreign oil).
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initiated the oil embargo in 1973, a domino effect occurred.19 The
rapidly rising cost of petroleum-based fuel sources inevitably led
to rising prices of non-petroleum fuel sources, which predictably
led to higher electric rates and economic inflation.20
This imbalance between domestic and foreign supply,
coupled with increasing demand, demonstrated not only an
economic disaster waiting to happen,21 but also a potential
national security catastrophe.22 In an attempt to remedy the
energy crisis in the United States, President Jimmy Carter’s
administration focused on developing a national energy policy,
and published a comprehensive National Energy Plan setting
forth the goals it hoped to achieve with energy legislation.23 The
administration developed three broad objectives—one each for
the short-term, medium-term, and long-term—to stabilize the
country’s energy consumption and promote energy independence

19. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-543, at 72 (1977).
20. See ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON COMPETITION IN WHOLESALE AND RETAIL MARKETS FOR
ELECTRIC ENERGY 20 (2005).
21. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-543, at 72–73 (1977) (“In 1973, a short oil embargo
against the United States curtailed millions of barrels of imports. According to
one study, this led to a loss of $20 billion of GNP in 1974 . . . . [T]he United
States has produced $375 billion less in output in the 1974-76 period than our
potential GNP. The economy will probably not regain the level of potential
output until the early 1980’s.”).
22. See National Energy Act: Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Comm. on Energy,
95th Cong. 70 (1977) (statement of Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense) (“The
threat to national security, the economy and our way of life which arises from
the energy crisis is not yet fully recognized by all . . . . [There is a] continuing
risk of oil supply interruptions and upward pressures on prices from politically
motivated embargoes such as we experienced 4 years ago . . . [and] the potential
for a much more serious interruption of oil supply by hostile forces in time of
war.”). C.f. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PRESIDENT CARTER’S ENERGY
PROPOSALS: A PERSPECTIVE 7 (1977) (“[A] reduction in imports is translated
into a reduction in the economic and national security risks associated with a
critical natural resource . . . .”).
23. President Carter took the oath of office in January 1977 amidst this
backdrop of energy insecurity, and only two weeks after he was sworn in, he
addressed the nation on the topic of energy. See President Jimmy Carter,
President Carter’s Fireside Chat on Energy, C-SPAN (Feb. 2, 1977),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?153913-1/president-carters-fireside-chat-energy.
President Carter emphasized the severity of the energy problem and told the
citizens of the nation in stark terms that it “must face the fact that the energy
shortage is permanent.” Id. President Carter also discussed solutions, such as
emphasizing solar and other renewable energy, and encouraging conservation
by both the citizenry and the utility companies. Id. See generally EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN (1977).
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through conservation and reduced reliance on fossil fuels.24
Electricity generation necessarily played a large role in
achieving these goals.25
The result of these efforts was the National Energy Act of
1978 (NEA). The NEA comprised 113 legislative initiatives
divided into five separate acts “that touched on practically all
energy sectors and had an impact on industries at all levels in
the energy arena.”26 Congress passed the National Energy Act
on November 9, 1978.27 One of the five parts, PURPA, aimed to
achieve the long-term goal of developing renewable energy
resources.28 Forty years later, PURPA remains a viable tool to
stimulate the incorporation of carbon-free energy into the
electric grid.
B. PUBLIC UTILITIES REGULATORY POLICY ACT
PURPA plays a critical role in achieving two goals
recognized as necessary to achieve energy security: conservation

24. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENERGY
PLAN xi (1977) (“The U.S. has three overriding energy objectives: as an
immediate objective that will become even more important in the future, to
reduce dependence on foreign oil and vulnerability to supply interruptions; in
the medium term, to keep U.S. imports sufficiently low to weather the period
when world oil production approaches its capacity limitation; and in the long
term, to have renewable and essentially inexhaustible sources of energy for
sustained economic growth.”).
25. While the sales of electricity only accounted for roughly three percent
of the gross national product in 1976, electricity generation consumed over
twenty-five percent of the country’s energy resources. See S. REP. NO. 95-442, at
7 (1977); Deirdre O’Callaghan & Steve Greenwald, PURPA from Coast to Coast:
America’s Great Electricity Experiment, 10 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 17, 17 (1996). To
exacerbate the problem, studies projected electric energy demand increasing
annually by five to more than seven percent and would constitute thirty-seven
percent of all energy demand in the United States by 1990 while residential
rates for electricity were declining by over one percent annually. S. REP. NO. 95442, at 8 (1977); see also ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE,
supra note 20, at 19.
26. Richardson & Nordhaus, supra note 17, at 63. The five acts passed as
part of the National Energy Act are (1) the Natural Gas Policy Act, (2) the Public
Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, (3) the Energy Tax Act, (4) the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act, and (5) the National Energy Conservation Policy Act.
Id. at 62–63; accord Richard F. Hirsh, PURPA: The Spur to Competition and
Utility Restructuring, 12 ELECTRICITY J. 60, 61 (1999).
27. Richardson & Nordhaus, supra note 17, at 63.
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018).
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and increased deployment of renewable energy.29 PURPA
addressed three major barriers to greater inclusion of
cogeneration and small power production facilities, the two types
of facilities identified as a clear means of achieving these goals.30
First, a utility was not generally willing to purchase the electric output
or was not willing to pay an appropriate rate. Secondly, some utilities
charged discriminatorily high rates for back-up service to cogenerators
and small power producers. Thirdly, a cogenerator or small power
producer which provided electricity to a utility’s grid ran the risk of
being considered an electric utility and thus being subjected to
extensive State and Federal regulation.31

PURPA’s success derives from reducing these three
barriers.32
In particular, section 201 of PURPA establishes a class of
non-utility power producers, called QFs, which are cogeneration
or small power production facilities that meet statutory
requirements.33 For example, PURPA requires small power
production facilities to derive power from renewable resources,
limits their “power production capacity” to no “greater than 80
megawatts,” and stipulates that this capacity limitation will
take into account all “other facilities located at the same site (as
determined by the Commission).”34 Once a facility obtains QF
status, section 210 of PURPA creates favorable conditions for the
non-utility generator to sell its power to utilities.35
Section 210 exempts QFs from most, if not all, of the
provisions of the Federal Power Act and the Public Utilities
29. See ELECTRIC ENERGY MARKET COMPETITION TASK FORCE, supra note
20, at 20 (“PURPA’s major goal was to promote energy conservation and
alternative energy technologies and to reduce oil and gas consumption through
use of improved technology and regulatory reforms.”).
30. See 45 Fed. Reg. 17959, 17959 (1980) (“[C]ogeneration facilities can
make a significant contribution to the Nation’s effort to conserve its energy
resources . . . . Small power production facilities . . . can reduce the need to
consume fossil fuels to generate electric power.”).
31. Id.
32. See Revesz & Unel, supra note 4, at 53 (“PURPA’s essential guarantee
that utilities interconnect and purchase power from qualifying facilities
triggered substantial development of non-utility, small-capacity generators.”);
Reinier H. J. H. Lock & Jack C. Van Kuiken, Cogeneration and Small Power
Production: State Implementation of Section 210 of PURPA, 3 SOLAR. L. REP.
659, 661 (1981) (“The primary goal of the PURPA Section 201/210 scheme is to
create, through regulation of the QF/utility relationship, a viable, economically
rational market for QF power.”).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(B) (2018).
34. Id.
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3 (2018).

370

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

Holding Company Act, resolving the issue of extensive federal
regulation as a barrier to entry.36 Section 210’s real significance,
however, comes from its mandates on utilities. It requires
utilities to sell power to QFs at “just and reasonable rates”37
without discrimination, ensuring a reliable source of back-up
power.38 Most importantly, section 210 requires utilities to
purchase all of the power generated by QFs at the “incremental
cost of alternative electric energy,” otherwise known as the
utilities’ avoided cost.39 Avoided cost rates are determined by
each states’ public utilities commission, and are often favorable
to the QF.40 PURPA thus creates a statutory tool to encourage
the creation of renewable energy facilities.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 made substantial
amendments to section 210 of PURPA.41 The emergence of
regional transmission organizations (RTO) and independent
system operators (ISO) facilitated the creation and expansion of
competitive markets for wholesale transactions of electricity.42

36. 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(e) (2018); see also Hirsh, supra note 26, at 62
(“Section 210 exempted qualifying small power producers whose capacity
remained less than 30 MW and qualifying cogenerators of any size from both
the Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act. Small
power producers whose capacities exceeded 30 MW but were smaller than 80
MW won exemption only from the former law.”).
37. Because power being sold to the QF is for its own consumption, and not
a sale for resale, the transaction falls under state authority as a retail sale
under section 201(b) of the Federal Power Act and the state PUC is required to
establish the “just and reasonable rates” for the utility’s sale to the QF. See 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (2018).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(c) (2018).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(a)(2), (b) & (d) (2018) (“‘[I]ncremental cost of
alternative electric energy’ means . . . the cost to the electric utility of the
electric energy which, but for the purchase from such cogenerator or small
power producer, such utility would generate or purchase from another source.”).
40. See Lock & Van Kuiken, supra note 32, at 669 (“The calculation of
avoided costs raises issues sufficiently complex and is so new that PUCs
currently have considerable latitude to make relatively subjective
determinations in the area. That may make high rates based on different
methodologies harder to challenge . . . .”). C.f. O’Callaghan & Greenwald, supra
note 25, at 18 (providing a case study of Maine’s implementation of PURPA’s
avoided cost rates).
41. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1253, 119 Stat. 594
(amending 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3).
42. RTOs and ISOs coordinate the transmission of electricity in large
regions covering multiple states. See LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW
AND POLICY 412–13 (2nd ed. 2018). These regional operators create wholesale
markets that run both day-ahead and in real time. Id. at 412. Electricity
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The Energy Policy Act’s amendments, inter alia, exempt utilities
from the purchase requirement if the QF has nondiscriminatory
access to a competitive wholesale electricity market.43 FERC
Orders No. 688 and No. 872 clarify that QFs operating in
competitive markets are still entitled to receive avoided cost
rates if they have a power production capacity of five MW or
under.44 Despite these recent changes to PURPA that alter its
operation in competitive markets, one-third of the United States’
electricity consumers are not served by an RTO or ISO and
remain in vertically-integrated wholesale markets, mainly
localized in the southeast United States, the Mountain West,
and the Pacific Northwest.45 The QFs in these regions are still
regulated by the eighty MW power production capacity limit.46
PURPA was and remains a success.47 “To date, the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act . . . has driven the largest
number of non-[renewable portfolio standard] utility

generators can then bid their production into the markets at transparent rates.
Id.
43. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(m) (2018).
44. See New PURPA Section 210(m) Regulations Applicable to Small Power
Production and Cogeneration Facilities, Order No. 688, 117 FERC ¶ 61,078, at
9 (2006), order on reh’g, Order No. 688–A, 119 FERC ¶ 61,305 (2007);
Implementation Issues Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978,
Order No. 872, 172 FERC ¶ 61,041, at 45 (2020), order on reh’g, Order No. 872–
A, 173 FERC ¶ 61,158 (2020).
45. See Electric Power Markets, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/industriesdata/market-assessments/electric-power-markets (last updated Oct. 23, 2020).
For a map of RTO/ISO service areas and the regions of the U.S. remaining
vertically-integrated, see U.S. Electricity Grid & Markets, EPA, https://
19january2021snapshot.epa.gov/greenpower/us-electricity-grid-markets_.html
(last updated June 26, 2020).
46. C.f. ISO/RTO COUNCIL, https://isorto.org/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2020)
(“Nine ISOs/RTOs serve two-thirds of electricity consumers in the United
States . . . .”).
47. See Colin Smith, What Drives Utility Solar Growth in a Post-ITCExtension World?, GTM (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com
/articles/read/What-Drives-Utility-Solar-Growth-in-a-Post-ITC-ExtensionWorld#gs.iIT7elMU (“In 2015, over 500 megawatts of PURPA-driven projects
came on-line in North Carolina . . . . PURPA will drive new utility solar as more
developers are able to achieve adequate returns from standard contracts.”);
Billy Ludt, Despite Utility Pressure, PURPA Has Continued to Diversify the
Energy Market 40 Years Strong, SOLAR POWER WORLD (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.solarpowerworldonline.com/2019/02/despite-utility-pressurepurpa-has-continued-to-diversify-the-energy-market-40-years-strong/
(“In
2017, PURPA projects accounted for approximately 2,000 of the 4,500 MW of
solar energy production added in the United States.”).
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[photovoltaic projects] in the U.S.”48 In 2018, it was predicted
PURPA would be the primary driver of utility-scale solar in the
United States.49 Geographic areas lacking RTOs and competitive
markets benefit the most from PURPA in terms of adding
renewable energy to the grid.50 PURPA is even credited as
playing a major role in creating the competitive wholesale
markets,51 which have driven the growth of renewable energy in
their own right.52
C. HISTORY OF THE EIGHTY MEGAWATT THRESHOLD
Early in PURPA’s history, FERC promulgated rules under
its statutory mandate to refine and implement the Act.53 The
Commission did not, however, add any additional clarification to
“power production capacity” as used in the statute. One question
that remained in the early months of PURPA’s implementation
was what factors would be used to determine the power
production capacity of a facility seeking QF status. An
application for certification as a QF gave FERC the opportunity
to address the issue soon after its final rule was published.54

48. Smith, supra note 47.
49. See Solar Energy Industries Association, PURPA 101, SEIA (Feb.
2018), https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/2018-06/SEIA-PURPA-101-Fact
sheet-2018-April.pdf.
50. See Ludt, supra note 47 (“The Southeast and mountainous Northwest
states boast the most PURPA solar projects. States like Idaho, Utah and
Montana, which aren’t necessarily known for having thriving solar markets,
have garnered a larger solar presence through PURPA.”).
51. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 42, at 377 (“PURPA . . . made it clear that
not all parts of the electricity industry needed to be insulated from
competition.”); Richardson & Nordhaus, supra note 17, at 66 (“The PURPA
program effectively demonstrated the feasibility of a competitive generation
sector in the electric power industry. It was this model that Congress looked to
fifteen years later when it enacted [the Energy Policy Act of 2005]’s expansion
of FERC’s mandatory wheeling authority and created a new class of wholesale
generator exempt from PUHCA. These enactments were designed to accelerate
the move toward a competitive bulk power market begun by the QF provisions
of PURPA.”); Hirsh, supra note 26, at 69 (“[I]mplementation of PURPA
stimulated creation of a free market for electricity.”).
52. See, e.g., Johannes Pfeifenberger et al., The Role of RTO/ISO Markets
in Facilitating Renewable Generation Development 8 (Dec. 8, 2016),
http://files.brattle.com/files/7444_the_role_of_rto_iso_markets_in_facilitating_
renewable_generation_development.pdf.
53. See 18 C.F.R. § 292 (2021).
54. See Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17 FERC ¶ 61,231, 61,444 (1981).
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Occidental Geothermal, Inc. was the first proceeding in front
of FERC to tackle the problem of interpreting the eighty MW
ceiling on power production capacity. Eight months after the
final rule was published in 1980, Occidental Geothermal, Inc.
applied for the certification of a proposed facility as a small
power production facility, but the California Public Utilities
Commission intervened in opposition, claiming the facility had
a generation capacity that was greater than the eighty MW
limit.55
FERC noted in its decision that in order to determine if the
facility should receive QF status, the Commission must define
“power production capacity.”56 FERC first addressed if the
facility’s nominal rating—the potential output of the generating
equipment under standard operating conditions—is an
appropriate measure of “power production capacity.”57 The
Commission concluded that such a standard is unsound.58 FERC
explained that the actual output of a facility may vary due to
inconsistent operating conditions such that the nominal rating
would not reflect the operational output in a meaningful way.59
Looking to the individual components utilized, FERC reasoned
that “it is not uncommon for smaller facilities to find it most
economic to employ commercially available components some of
which have individual capabilities significantly exceeding the
overall facility capabilities.”60 Finding no solution in the nominal
rating of either the facility as a whole or its components, FERC
decided on a less restrictive approach.
The Commission will consider the “power production capacity” of a
facility to be the maximum net output of the facility which can be safely
and reliably achieved under the most favorable operating conditions
likely to occur over a period of several years. The net output of the
facility is its send out61 after subtraction of the power used to operate
auxiliary equipment in the facility necessary for power generation
(such as pumps, blowers, fuel preparation machinery, and exciters) and

55. Occidental Geothermal planned to construct a facility in Lake County,
California that it believed satisfied the definitional requirements of a small
power production facility under PURPA § 201 and the Commission’s
promulgated rules. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at ¶ 61,445.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. FERC utilizes the term “send out” in lieu of export.
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for other essential electricity uses in the facility from the gross
generator output.62

Recognizing inherent fluctuations in the generation of
electricity, FERC further held that even if the facility generated
more than eighty MW on an extremely infrequent basis, it was
still eligible to be a qualifying facility.63 FERC granted the
application, and in so doing, established a precedent that
provided consistent application and a baseline that was refined
over the subsequent four decades.64
Later in the decade, FERC clarified what may constitute
“auxiliary equipment” as used in Occidental Geothermal.65 In
Malacha Power, a QF applied for recertification as a QF after
changes were made to the configuration of the facility.66 Malacha
Power requested that interconnection equipment—equipment
needed to transmit power from the facility to the purchasing
utility—be included as part of the QF, and therefore load losses

62. Id.
63. Id. (“The occasional occurrence of power outputs of more than 80
megawatts does not necessarily indicate a power production capacity exceeding
the qualifying limit if the occurrences are rare, such as once or twice in a five
year period, and if they are clearly attributable to unusual circumstances. Thus,
an applicant’s statement that under certain circumstances the send out may
exceed 80 megawatts does not in itself prevent qualification.”).
64. See Power Developers, Inc., 32 FERC ¶ 61,101, 61,276 (1985) (“[T]he
Commission has interpreted the capacity of a qualifying facility for purposes of
obtaining qualifying status to be its net power production output, rather than
its gross output.”); Massachusetts Refusetech, Inc., 25 FERC ¶ 61,406, 61,912
(1983) (“[A]ctual site conditions, including limitation on the energy resource
supply, are considered under [the power production capacity] test.”); Penntech
Papers, Inc., 48 FERC ¶ 61,120, 61,423 (1989) (“[T]he amount of electric power
actually capable of being displaced by a facility is the facility’s output . . . .”);
Coso Finance Partners (Navy I Facility), 50 FERC ¶ 62,153, 63,153 n.4 (1990)
(“[T]he facility will be controlled by a distributed control . . . designed to
maintain the average maximum net electric output at the point of delivery to
80 MW during each 15 minute interval.”). C.f. S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 443
F.3d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that FERC did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in its evaluation of net power production as it relates to a
geothermal energy facility); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, 115 FERC ¶ 61,237,
61,876–77 (2006) (holding that a regional system operator may not require a
qualifying facility selling energy into a regional transmission market to do so
on the basis of gross production capacity instead of net production capacity);
Ormesa, LLC, 107 FERC ¶ 61,043, 61,1150–51 (2004) (determining what
amount of energy used in the transportation and reinjection of geothermal brine
should be deducted from the power production capacity of a geothermal
qualifying facility).
65. See Malacha Power Project, Inc., 41 FERC ¶ 61,350, 61,350 (1987).
66. See id. at 1–2.
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incurred at those points would be subtracted from the net
output.67 The interconnection equipment in question was
substantial, including a transmission line nearly eighteen miles
long.68 Relying on precedent, FERC concluded in 1987 that the
requested interconnection equipment did constitute auxiliary
equipment as used in Occidental Geothermal because the sole
use of the equipment is to supply power to the utility.69
Effectively, Malacha Power established that equipment
necessary to transmit the power to the purchasing utility is part
of the QF, and any load reductions on the QF-side of the
interconnection are subtracted from net output.70
FERC continued to expand the understanding, latitude, and
flexibility of this interpretation of power production capacity in
the 1990s. In 1991, in American Ref-Fuel Co., FERC
dramatically extended its own holding in Occidental that found
periodic exceedances of the eighty MW limit permissible if
sufficiently infrequent.71 While Occidental articulated an
allowance for peaks over eighty MW “once or twice in a five-year
period,”72 in American Ref-Fuel Co., FERC relied on two orders
subsequent to Occidental to refine its approach to sporadic
exceedances that nevertheless averaged eighty MW over a
period of time.73 Through analyzing the particulars of those two
orders, FERC created a new standard in American Ref-Fuel that

67. See id. at 2.
68. See id. (“The interconnection equipment includes: (1) a powerhouse
substation that will contain a 13.8 /115 kV delta/grounded-wye transformer
rated 21/28/35 MVA OA/FA/FOA at 65° C located near the powerhouse of the
facility; (2) a 17.9-mile 115 kV transmission line with 477 MCM 1 8/1 strand
ACSR conductors; and (3) a ‘mini-substation’ that will contain a 115 /230 kV
delta/grounded-wye transformer rated 21/28/35 MVA OA/FA/FOA at 65° C
located at PG&E’s Pit No. 1 substation.”).
69. See id. The Commission reached this conclusion after analysis of two
prior orders, Clarion Power Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,317 (1987) and Sycamore
Cogeneration Co., 40 FERC ¶ 61,237 (1987). See id.
70. See id. at 3. (“Accordingly, we find that when the interconnection
equipment is part of the qualifying facility, the electric power production
capacity of the facility is the capacity that the electric power production
equipment delivers to the point of interconnection with the purchasing electric
utility’s transmission system.”).
71. See American Ref-Fuel Co. of Bergen County, 54 FERC ¶ 61,287, 61,818
(1991); Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17 FERC ¶ 61,231, 61,445 (1981).
72. Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17 FERC at ¶ 61,445.
73. See American Ref-Fuel, 54 FERC at ¶ 61,817 (comparing the
Commission’s analysis in Massachusetts Refusetech, Inc. and Coso Finance
Partners).
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based the eighty MW threshold on a rolling one-hour interval.74
The new standard allowed small power production facilities to
regularly exceed eighty MW as long as the average output over
any one-hour period was below the eighty MW threshold.75
FERC, through this order, demonstrated an intent to ensure
maximum utilization of a resource while also creating flexibility
for the generator to maintain a near-constant eighty MW
output.76
These orders demonstrate that FERC relied on, refined, and
expanded the holding in Occidental Geothermal and subsequent
proceedings to produce a stable and reliable definition of power
production capacity.
D. BROADVIEW SOLAR
The Commission’s 2020 decision in Broadview Solar
reversed the decades-old precedent discussed above.77 The order,
issued by a split three-to-one panel of Commissioners,78 denied
QF status to a solar photovoltaic and battery storage facility in
Montana, holding that net capacity would no longer be the

74. See id. at ¶ 61,817–18.
75. FERC explained this decision is due to the inherent variability in
electricity generation. Id. “We note that the output of generation equipment is
affected by many dynamic factors, including ambient temperature, fuel heat
content, and system load changes. As a result, generation output fluctuates
instantaneously and accordingly must be adjusted many times each hour to
follow system load changes.” Id. at ¶ 61,817.
76. See id. FERC’s order provides a detailed analysis explaining how the
Commission reached the decision. See id. at ¶ 61,816–18. What is notable and
relevant to the coming analysis is the reference to the applicant facility’s design
and operation. “[T]he facility is equipped with an automatic control system
which will compensate for the substantial variation in the heat content of the
fuel source, primarily by reducing airflow and the volume of waste being fed
into the furnaces, to restore net generation at the 80-MW level . . . . [T]he
automatic control system cannot make the required corrections
instantaneously. It can however, maintain an 80-MW net output level, on
average, over any 60-minute time span measured at any point in time (a ‘rolling
one-hour period’).” Id. at ¶ 61,816.
77. See generally Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194 (2020).
78. The split decision was along party lines with all three Republican
commissioners denying qualifying under the statute, while the one Democrat
commissioner filing a dissent. See id. at 1, 12. While FERC is normally headed
by five commissioners, the fifth commissioner position remained unfilled at the
time the decision was made. See Current and Previous Chairmen, FED. ENERGY
REG.
COMM’N.,
https://www.ferc.gov/about/commission-members/currentprevious-chairmen (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
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standard for the eighty MW upper limit under PURPA and the
Commission’s rules.79
Broadview Solar’s facility presents a new, but increasingly
common design. The facility consists of a 160 MW photovoltaic
solar array and a fifty MW battery storage system that “is
configured to optimize [megawatt-hour] production . . . within
the 80 MW capacity limit . . . .”80 To remain within that capacity
limit, the facility employs twenty direct-current to alternatingcurrent inverters that regulate the maximum gross power of the
facility to eighty-two and a half MW.81 Finally, “facility loads and
losses” bring the total net capacity of the facility to the
statutorily required eighty MW.82 “[R]egardless of how the
facility is operated, the facility is physically incapable of
exceeding the 80 MW limit because of the presence of the
[twenty] inverters.”83
This unique design’s oversized solar array and battery
storage combination provided FERC with an opportunity to
reevaluate Occidental Geothermal’s net capacity standard.84 The

79. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,276; 16 U.S.C. § 796(17) (2018);
18 C.F.R. § 292.207(b) (2021).
80. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,272 (explaining how the solar
array and battery storage combination “increases the facility’s capacity factor
from . . . 25% . . . to nearly 40%”).
81. Id. (“According to Broadview, solar arrays and battery storage facilities
generate and store electricity as [direct current (DC)] power, and the grid
generally operates using [alternating current (AC)] power . . . . [T]hese
inverters are the ‘gateway’ between the DC power provided by the solar array
and battery storage system and the AC grid . . .[I]f the solar array produces
more DC power than can be converted to AC power through the inverters or
stored in the battery storage system, the inverters will cause the solar array to
produce less power.” (footnotes omitted)). DC—direct current—power is a
constant, unidirectional flow of electricity, and in the United States is typically
associated with the power delivered from batteries, while AC—alternating
current—power which oscillates between positive and negative directions and
is typically associated with the power that delivered from wall outlets. See
Elizabeth Earley, What’s the Difference Between AC and DC?, MIT (Sept. 17,
2013), https://engineering.mit.edu/engage/ask-an-engineer/whats-the-differenc
e-between-ac-and-dc/. The vast majority of the US’s electricity grid utilizes
alternative current due to AC power’s ability to easily step-up or step-down to
different voltages through the use of a transformer. See Allison Lantero, The
War of the Currents: AC vs. DC Power, DEP’T. OF ENERGY (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.energy.gov/articles/war-currents-ac-vs-dc-power.
82. Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,272.
83. Id. at ¶ 62,273.
84. Id. at ¶ 62,276 (“That such a project arguably could satisfy the ‘send
out’ analysis the Commission applied in Occidental compels us to reconsider
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Commission held that in light of the overbuilt facility falling
within the parameters of power production capacity as it is
defined in Occidental Geothermal, the standard of utilizing net
capacity, or “send out,” would no longer be dispositive of a
facility’s compliance with the eighty MW threshold.85 FERC thus
altered how power production capacity will be determined going
forward. The Commission, without stating so in clear language,
held that the standard for power production capacity will be
based on the nominal rating of the generating equipment or
individual components86—the very standard rejected by
Occidental Geothermal.87 Because FERC determined the facility
exceeded the power production capacity limit under the new
standard, it did not address whether the battery storage is
considered a co-located but separate facility, a component of the
larger facility, or how it should be included in a determination of
the power production capacity.88
The lone dissenting voice, Commissioner Glick, argued not
only that the Commission should follow precedent, but that the
Commission was going against clear Congressional intent.89
Commissioner Glick did what the majority order did not; he
performed both plain language and statutory analyses.90
Commissioner Glick explained that in reading the statute, “[i]t
is hard for me to understand how the term ‘facility’ could mean
anything other than the power plant as a whole. After all, as
used in this context, the term ‘facility’ typically refers to an
entire building or structure, not its component parts.”91 He also

whether it is a facility’s ‘send out’ that is determinative of whether the facility
complies with the 80 MW threshold established in PURPA.”).
85. See id. (“[W]e find that the Commission’s statement in Occidental that
‘the power production capacity’ of a facility is ‘the maximum net output of the
facility,’ which is ‘its send out,’ is not consistent with the 80 MW ‘power
production capacity’ limit expressly specified by the statute and
regulations . . . . [W]e conclude that we have improperly focused on ‘output’ and
‘send out,’ instead of on ‘power production capacity,’ which is the standard
established both in the statute and our regulations.” (footnotes omitted)).
86. See id. at ¶ 62,275 n.11 (“In this order . . . the 160 MW solar array is
double the 80 MW statutory limit for power production capacity . . . .”).
87. See Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17 FERC ¶ 61,231, 61,444–45 (1981).
88. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,275 n.57.
89. See id. at ¶ 62,278 (Glick, Comm’r., dissenting) (“Under any fair reading
of the statute or Commission precedent, Broadview’s power production capacity
is 80 MW, making it eligible for QF status.”).
90. See id. at ¶ 62,277–78.
91. Id. at ¶ 62,278.
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pointed to the Conference Report that accompanied PURPA,
explaining that it “describes a small power production facility by
referring to, for example, ‘solar electric systems’ . . . . As with
facility, ‘system’ would seem to contemplate the power plant as
a whole, not just its photovoltaic panels.”92 With this analysis,
Commissioner Glick concluded that “the term ‘facility’ indicates
that QF status should turn on the actual power production
capacity of the facility as a whole, not the capacity of its largest
individual component part.”93
The dissent also tackled battery storage, even though the
majority refused to address it, and pointed out that the battery
storage system does not produce power on its own, but that the
power is generated “exclusively” by the solar array.94 Finally,
Commissioner Glick argued that the decision introduces
“unnecessary uncertainty” into what was previously an area of
settled law.95 FERC denied Broadview Solar’s request for
rehearing through inaction,96 and the Montana-based company
filed a petition for review with the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in December 2020.97
E. BROADVIEW REHEARING
Before the case could be heard in the D.C. Circuit, FERC
again changed course. Pursuant to the authority granted by
section 313 of the Federal Power Act,98 FERC set aside the result
of Broadview Solar.99 The new order, decided by a split three-totwo panel of Commissioners,100 functionally and explicitly
92. Id. at ¶ 62,277 n.27.
93. Id. at ¶ 62,277.
94. Id.
95. Id. at ¶ 62,278.
96. See 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a) (2018) (“Unless the Commission acts upon the
application for rehearing within thirty days after it is filed, such application
may be deemed to have been denied.”)
97. Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194 (2020), appeal docketed, No.
20-01487 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2020).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a) (2018) (“Until the record in a proceeding shall have
been filed in a court of appeals, as provided in subsection (b), the Commission
may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem
proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or
issued by it under the provisions of this Act.”).
99. Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199, 61,796 (2021).
100. This time the split decision did not follow party lines. Commissioner
Neil Chatterjee, demoted from the Chairman position on November 5, 2020,
changed his position and sided with the majority in Broadview Rehearing,
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reestablishes the precedential value of Occidental Geothermal
and the subsequent cases that developed the eighty MW
threshold discussed herein, and restored the net output
interpretation of power production capacity.101
FERC granted the Broadview facility QF status,102 but more
importantly, evaluated both the statutory context and the now
restored precedential history in direct terms, providing an
analysis and reasoning on the record.103 First, FERC established
that the statute does not define facility or power production
capacity, nor do the terms have common meanings that resolve
the ambiguity of the question.104 As such, the Commission
asserted its interpretation is due deference under the Chevron
standard.105
Moving on to the actual interpretation of power production
capacity, FERC looked at the ambiguity of two terms—“facility”
and “power production capacity”—and how they are used in
connection with each other in the statute.106 FERC explained,
“we believe that the statute’s emphasis on the ‘power production
capacity’ of the ‘facility’ supports [an approach] in which power
production capacity is measured based on what the facility can
actually produce for sale to the interconnected electric utility.”107
In the same paragraph, FERC refuted Broadview Solar’s
component based determination by articulating that “[f]ocusing
only on the solar panels in this instance would ignore the
commonly understood meaning of the term facility without any
textual indication that Congress intended us to do so.”108 Beyond
merely relying on this conclusory language, FERC pointed to the
language in the statute led it to this conclusion.109 Specifically,
FERC explained:
That interpretation is further confirmed when we consider the terms
“facility” and “power production capacity” in light of “their context and

reestablishing the net capacity interpretation. See id. at ¶ 61,792; Arianna
Skibell, Chaterjee Out, Danly in as FERC Chairman, ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 5,
2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1063717931.
101. See Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC at ¶ 61,796.
102. See id. at ¶ 61,799–800.
103. See id. at ¶ 61,804–07.
104. Id. at ¶ 61,796.
105. See id. at ¶ 61,796 n.66. See also infra note 117.
106. See Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC at ¶ 61,797.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
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with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” The purpose
of PURPA’s 80 MW “power production capacity” limitation is to reserve
the benefits of QF status for only certain types of facilities. When a
facility meets the QF requirements, the benefits of that
status . . . accrue to the facility as a whole. Given that statutory
structure, and the importance of the rights at the point of
interconnection, we find that the best interpretation of the 80-MW
limit on a facility’s power production capacity is as a limit on the
facility’s net output to the electric utility (i.e., at the point of
interconnection), taking into account all components necessary to
produce electric energy in a form useful to an interconnected entity.
This interpretation aligns the 80-MW limitation with the mandatory
obligations and interconnection rights that are the foundation of
Congress’s efforts to “encourage” QF development under PURPA.110

With this, FERC returned to the interpretation established
in Occidental Geothermal and the subsequent cases expanding
the scope of PURPA’s eighty MW threshold.
Not content to rely on statutory analysis alone, FERC also
compared the proposed facility to those certified in both
Occidental Geothermal and Malacha Power to demonstrate the
similarities between the proposed facility and the facilities in
those adjudications.111 Doing so provided the Commission the
opportunity to demonstrate how the interpretation it is
forwarding through statutory analysis is supported by the
longstanding jurisprudence surrounding PURPA and QF
status.112
Last, it is important to note that between the decisions in
Broadview Solar and Broadview Rehearing, the composition of
FERC and the presidential administration changed.
Commissioner Glick, now Chairman Glick, was promoted to the
leadership role by President Biden on January 21, 2021, the day
after the presidential inauguration.113 Commissioner Bernard L.
McNamee’s term ended on September 4, 2020,114 and the Senate
confirmed the two newest FERC Commissioners, Mark Christie
and Allison Clements, on November 30, 2020, filling McNamee’s

110. Id. (footnotes omitted).
111. Id. at ¶ 61,797–98.
112. See id.
113. See Meet the Commissioners: Chairman Glick, FERC, https://www.ferc
.gov/about/commission-members/chairman-glick (last updated Oct. 25, 2021).
114. See Current and Previous Chairmen, supra note 78.

382

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

seat and the vacancy that existed when Broadview Solar was
decided.115
F. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
Broadview Rehearing is currently docketed on appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.116 The
D.C. Circuit will evaluate FERC’s decisions in Broadview Solar
and Broadview Rehearing within an intricate web of
jurisprudence that guides judicial review of federal agency
interpretations of statutory provisions. It is important to
establish the type of examination Broadview Saga will be subject
to better analyze the error of the initial decision and establish
why the D.C. Circuit should affirm Broadview Rehearing. The
body of scholarship studying this type of judicial review is as
wide as it is deep and is vastly complex. Broadly speaking,
judicial review of federal agency interpretations of federal
statutes is performed under the guidance of the Chevron
Doctrine117 and the Administrative Procedure Act.118
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) not only provides
the necessary cause of action for petitioners to challenge a final
agency action,119 but is also the foundation to guide the court’s
decision.120 The APA directs reviewing courts to “hold unlawful

115. See Press Release, FERC, Senate Votes to Confirm Christie, Clements
to Commission (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.ferc.gov/news-events/news/senatevotes-confirm-christie-clements-commission.
116. Broadview Solar, LLC, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2021), appeal docketed;
Solar Energy Industries v. FERC, No. 21–01126 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2021).
117. See Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (“When a
court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather,
if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”).
118. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2018).
119. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court
are subject to judicial review.”).
120. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
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and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law.”121
Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the
agency must contemporaneously—read in the order—explain
the reasoning for its ultimate decision.122 This is not to say the
APA bars an agency from changing how it interprets statutory
language. On the contrary, an agency is generally granted wide
latitude in this regard and is permitted to update, revise, or
change statutory interpretations, even without an impetus or
cause to do so.123 The arbitrary and capricious standard does,
however, demand that if the agency decides to reevaluate the
meaning of an ambiguous statutory term that it explain why it
did so.124 This is not a high bar, and it substantially defers to
agencies to decide, based on an acknowledgement of their
expertise in their given fields, the best course of action and
interpretation of the statutes they are charged with enforcing.125
There are few, but important, caveats to this broad
deference. While this reasoned analysis does not always need to
be more detailed than the justification for a new policy, the
analysis should include an explanation to justify a change when
“its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those
which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has
engendered serious reliance interests.”126 Ignoring the facts that
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”).
121. Id.
122. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 48–49 (1983) (“We have frequently reiterated that an agency must
cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner . . . and
we reaffirm this principle again today.” (citations omitted)).
123. See id. at 57 (“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may
change, either with or without a change in circumstances.”).
124. See id. (“[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned
analysis . . . .” (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841,
852 (D.C. Cir. 1970))).
125. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he
agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need
not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy
are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is
permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the
agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately
indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide a more detailed
justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate.”).
126. Id. at 515.

384

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

led to the original interpretation, the implications of a decision,
and the impact it will have on regulated parties is plainly
arbitrary and capricious.127
G. RENEWABLE ENERGY AND BATTERY STORAGE CAPABILITIES
The course correction made in Broadview Rehearing will
continue to encourage renewable energy integration and expand
access for battery storage participation into the nation’s power
grid at a time when it is urgently needed. Renewable energy is
widely recognized as a necessary solution to the growing list of
negative externalities associated with fossil-fuel powered
electricity generation.128 The amount of electricity generated by
renewable energy doubled over the last decade.129 In 2020,
renewable energy provided 20% of the total electricity
generation in the United States.130 Many states enacted
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) to mandate the inclusion of
renewable energy to diversify their electricity mix.131 PURPA
127. See id. at 515–16.
128. See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, Providing All Global Energy
with Wind Water, and Solar, Part I: Technologies, Energy Resources, Quantities
and Areas of Infrastructure, and Materials, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1154, 1154 (2011)
(“A solution to the problems of climate change, air pollution, water pollution,
and energy insecurity requires a large-scale conversion to clean, perpetual, and
reliable energy at low cost together with an increase in energy efficiency.”); Jay
Squalli, Renewable Energy, Coal as a Baseload Power Source, and Greenhouse
Gas Emissions: Evidence from U.S. State-Level Data, 127 ENERGY 479, 479
(2017) (“Renewable energy is often praised for its ability to mitigate
environmental emissions, improve public health, increase economic activity
through job creation, and provide a more reliable and affordable energy
system.”).
129. U.S. Renewable Electricity Generation Has Doubled Since 2008, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=38752#:~:text=Renewables%20provided%2017.6
%25%20of%20electricity,from%20wind%20and%20solar%20generation.
130. See Electricity Explained: Electricity in the United States, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the
-us.php [https://perma.cc/8FPK-2X8G] (last updated Mar. 18, 2021). While
accounting for 20% of electricity generation, total consumption of renewable
energy in 2020 was 12%, due mainly to the transportation sector’s
overwhelming reliance on fossil fuels. See Renewable Energy Explained, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/renewablesources/ [https://perma.cc/HAT3-946B] (last updated May 20, 2021). The
breakdown of the 12% of total renewable consumption in 2020 is 39% biomass,
26% wind, 22% hydroelectric, 11% solar, and 2% geothermal. Id.
131. See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF
ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renew
able-portfolio-standards.aspx#:~:text=Thirty%20states%2C%20Washington%2
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remains a powerful tool to encourage renewables adoption. As
the price of solar technologies continues to drop, the ability to
provide energy under the utility’s avoided cost rate is
improving.132
Despite these trends, there are still major barriers to the
increased adoption of renewables. A large minority of states
have only an unenforceable renewable energy goal or no
program at all.133 Additionally, there are technological
limitations inherent to the energy source. One such limitation to
some renewable energy fuel sources is their variability.134 This
variability requires grid operators and utilities to frequently
supplement renewable energy with baseload and peak power
from more consistent sources, most often fossil-fuel or nuclearpowered generation.135 However, recent advances in technology
coupled with decreasing prices in battery storage demonstrate it
is possible to achieve increased reliability from renewables plus
battery storage.136 Although not cost effective enough to fully
supplant baseload generation from other sources, battery
C%20D.C.%2C,have%20set%20renewable%20energy%20goals.
An
RPS
requires utilities, and occasionally municipalities and rural electric
cooperatives, to source a specified amount of the electricity they provide from
renewable sources. Id. Thirty states currently have a RPS program. Id.
132. See Solar Energy Industries Association, supra note 49.
133. See State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, supra note 131.
134. See Suberu et al., supra note 11, at 500 (“[R]enewable energy sources
(RES) are inexhaustible in quantity but they are characterized with fluctuating
power output as commonly observed in wind, tidal wave and solar power
systems.”).
135. See Benjamin Matek and Karl Gawell, The Benefits of Baseload
Renewables: A Misunderstood Energy Technology, 28 ELEC. J. 101, 102–03
(2015) (“In the past, baseload power came mostly from coal and nuclear
facilities . . . . Baseload power is the minimum amount of power that a utility or
distribution company must generate for its customers, or the amount of power
required to meet minimum demands based on reasonable expectations of
customer requirements”); Squalli, supra note 128, at 479 (“[T]he intermittency
of renewable energy sources necessitates the use of a baseload power source
such as coal, natural gas or nuclear power.”); see also WILL MCNAMARA, ISSUE
BRIEF: ENERGY STORAGE TO REPLACE PEAKER PLANTS 1 (2020) (“[R]apidramping units, known as peaker plants . . . , exist to come online
quickly . . . when baseload or intermediate units cannot meet unanticipated
surges in demand.”).
136. See Herman K. Trabish, Battery Energy Storage Is Getting Cheaper, but
How Much Deployment Is Too Much?, UTIL. DIVE (June 30, 2020),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/battery-energy-storage-is-getting-cheaperbut-how-much-deployment-is-too-m/579183/ (“As renewable penetrations rise,
batteries are the answer to variability, but it is not clear when buying more
storage stops increasing reliability.”).
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storage technology is now cost competitive with natural gas
powered “peaker” plants137 in many parts of the United States
without the associated negative externalities.138 It is important
to note, however, that the economics of renewable energy plus
battery storage often require oversized renewable generation
relative to the size of the battery storage and the facility’s
output.139 It is becoming standard procedure for facilities
concerned with mitigating costs, such as a potential QF, to build
renewable energy generation in excess of what the facility
intends to send out to mitigate or even reduce the size of the
battery storage component.140
As a result of the clear benefits of renewable energy and the
technological advances in battery storage, there are increasing
efforts worldwide to pair renewable energy and battery storage
to achieve consistent and reliable carbon-free technology that
can substantially displace fossil-fuel generation.141 The United

137. See MCNAMARA, supra note 135, at 1. “Peaker plants, designed to ramp
up electricity production during periods when normal production isn’t
sufficient, have been used for decades to meet peak demand on the grid.” Id. at
2.
138. See id. at 2, 4 (explaining that peaker plants generate more pollution
than baseload fossil-fuel plants for the same unit of electricity produced and are
often located in low-income and minority communities); cf. Jahedul Islam
Chowdhury et al., Techno-Environmental Analysis of Battery Storage for Grid
Level Energy Services, 131 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS., 1, 15
(July 10, 2020) (“[A]n optimised [battery electrical energy storage] and
interconnectors may pave the way for phasing out of [combined cycle gas
turbine] variable generation.”).
139. See Micah S. Ziegler et al., Storage Requirements and Cost of Shaping
Renewable Energy Toward Grid Decarbonization, 3 JOULE 2134, 2137 (2019)
(“As storage energy capacity costs rise, the installed capacity of wind or solar
generation relative to both storage energy capacity and plant output power
generally increases for cost-minimized systems . . . . This is because for higher
storage energy capacity costs, it is less expensive to install more renewables
generation than to increase storage capacity, even if this leads to the
renewables plant generating energy that is in excess of the energy used as
baseload, intermediate, bipeaker, or peaker output.”).
140. See id. at 2137–38 (“Sizing renewables to have greater power capacity
than the output shape power is a cost-reducing measure that is used in almost
all of the cost-minimized systems across the locations considered . . . .”).
141. See Michael Kern, Britain Bets Big on Battery Storage, OILPRICE (Nov.
30, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News
/Britain-Bets-Big-On-Battery-Storage.html (“The UK Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) has approved the construction of the
biggest battery storage project in the UK, and one of the largest such projects
in the world . . . [which will] become operational in 2024.”); Adam Morton,
Victoria Plans 300MW Tesla Battery to Help Stabilise Grid as Renewables
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States installed a record high of 476 MW of storage in the third
quarter of 2020 alone, a 240% increase over the previous
quarter.142 The U.S. Energy Information Administration
predicts that a high penetration of solar energy capacity in the
southeast and western United States could help drive up to fiftyseven gigawatts of battery storage nationwide by 2050, thus
decreasing the need for fossil-fuel plants in those regions.143 But
this projection requires an infusion of solar projects, which is
difficult in regions like the west and southeast that are not
covered by an RTO/ISO and in which many states do not have
an RPS.144

Increase, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2020, 9:38 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/australia-news/2020/nov/05/victoria-plans-300mw-tesla-battery-to-helpstabilise-grid-as-renewables-increase; Emma Penrod, Solar-Plus-Storage
Poised To Become More Financially Attractive, but Seasonal Solutions Remain
Key, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/solar-plusstorage-poised-to-become-more-financially-attractive-but-season/589857/
(explaining how solar-plus-storage has “already begun to displace open cycle
gas turbines”).
142. See US Energy Storage Market Shatters Records in Q3 2020, WOOD
MACKENZIE (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/us-energy
-storage-market-shatters-records-in-q3-2020/. The fourth quarter of 2019 held
the previous record high for energy storage deployment at 186.4 MW. See US
Energy Storage Market Sets Q2 Record for Deployments, ENERGY STORAGE
ASS’N (Sept. 3, 2020), https://energystorage.org/us-energy-storage-market-setsq2-record-for-deployments/. The 476 MW record includes additions to the
Gateway Energy Storage Project, a 250 MW battery that came online in stages
between June and September in San Diego County, CA. See Darrell Proctor,
World’s Largest—For Now—Battery Storage Project Online in California,
POWER (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.powermag.com/worlds-largest-for-now
-battery-storage-project-online-in-california/#:~:text=Gateway%20Energy%20
Storage%20is%20currently,MW%20of%20capacity%20on%20Aug.
The
Gateway Energy Storage Project “is currently the largest battery energy storage
project in the world.” Id.
143. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2020 82 (2020),
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2020%20Full%20Report.pdf
(displaying graphics that predict solar energy capacity’s impact by 2050).
144. See U.S. Electricity Grid & Markets, supra note 45 (“Traditionally
regulated electricity markets dominate most of the Southeast, Northwest and
much of the west (excluding California). In these states, most renewable energy
projects are utility-owned. As a result, developing large green power project in
a traditionally regulated state and claiming renewable energy use can often be
challenging.”); see generally Summary Maps, DSIRE, https://programs
.dsireusa.org/system/program/maps (last visited Dec. 6, 2020) (applying
program type filter for Renewables Portfolio Standard).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. THE LEGAL ERROR OF BROADVIEW SOLAR
An evaluation of the turbulent back and forth between two
competing interpretations of power production capacity
necessarily starts with an analysis of the Broadview Solar order
and the defective reasoning deployed by FERC before turning to
what the rehearing and setting aside of that order says about
the Commission and its process. The Commission’s split decision
in Broadview Solar undercut FERC’s own authority by
subverting longstanding precedent and creating semantic
ambiguity for the sake of changing policy direction. To reach its
conclusion, FERC pointed to the very technological advances
that keep QFs competitive in modern electricity markets as
incompatible with the precedential understanding of PURPA
going back to Occidental Geothermal.145 This abrupt policy shift
not only introduced uncertainty into settled law, but was plainly
at odds with the history of PURPA and prior FERC
interpretations.146 Further, the Commission simply used
conclusory language and failed to adequately express how it
reached its disrupting decision.147
1. Broadview Solar was Insufficiently Reasoned
FERC’s decision to overturn its own longstanding precedent
was insufficiently explained in the Commission’s order. FERC
referenced Occidental Geothermal, Malacha Power, and
American Ref-Fuel Co., explaining the relevance of each
decision’s efforts to clarify the eighty MW threshold and the
utilization of net output as the dispositive measure.148 It was
even more inexplicable, then, that on the same page of the order
FERC distinguished the proposed Broadview facility as a
“significant departure” from anything previously encountered by
FERC.149 So significant a departure, in fact, that the

145. See Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,276 (2020) (“That
such a project arguably could satisfy the ‘send out’ analysis the Commission
applied in Occidental compels us to reconsider whether it is a facility’s ‘send out’
that is determinative of whether the facility complies with the 80 MW threshold
established in PURPA.”).
146. See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
147. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,275–77.
148. Id. at ¶ 62,275.
149. Id. at ¶ 62,275–76.
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Commission decided to completely reject the net output
analysis.150 FERC explained, “we find that the ‘send out’
analysis applied in Occidental is inconsistent with the 80 MW
‘power production capacity’ limitation in PURPA for small power
production QFs, based on our reading of the statute and
regulations.”151 Significantly, though, the Commission did not
relate what it found that led it to arrive at this conclusion.152
FERC did not point to what in the statute or regulations led it
to reach this conclusion beyond a passing reference to the plain
language of PURPA and a mere footnote refuting the dissent’s
analysis.153 Instead, FERC relied on the size of the solar array
as proof in itself of the incongruity of the facility, and those like
it, receiving QF status.154 To justify this, FERC stated, “[w]e
find, however, there is a significant difference between (i) design
capabilities that may incidentally or occasionally cross PURPA’s
80 MW threshold due to certain components or variances, such
as fuel or ambient temperature and (ii) a facility purposefully
designed with a 160 MW solar array.”155 This simply does not
provide the justification one would expect from a decision of such
magnitude and with such potential ramifications.
Because FERC did not discuss what it found in the statutes
and regulations that led it to determine that net output is
inconsistent with power production capacity, an analysis of
FERC’s final disposition is confined to probing the language of
the order to try to develop an understanding of how the
Broadview facility’s design challenged the net output analysis
150. Id. at ¶ 62,276.
151. Id.
152. Cf. id. at ¶ 62,277 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting) (“[The majority’s]
conclusion finds no support in the statute, our precedent, or common sense.”).
153. See id. at ¶ 62,276 (“Re-examining Occidental and the potential such
an analysis creates for the approval of projects that do not comply with the plain
language of PURPA, we conclude that we have improperly focused on ‘output’
and ‘send out,’ instead of on ‘power production capacity,’ which is the standard
established both in the statute and our regulations.”); id. at ¶ 62, 276 n.59
(“[T]he applicable statutory standard considers a facility’s power production
capacity, not its capacity factor.”).
154. See id. at ¶ 62,275 (“Through PURPA, Congress sought to encourage
small power production facilities of not more than 80 MW capacity and, in fact,
specified that such facilities should have a ‘power production capacity’ of not
greater than 80 MW. Prior Commission precedent sometimes allowed facilities
with greater power production capacities to be certified as QFs when the net
output was no more than 80 MW and also sometimes allowed intermittent net
outputs slightly in excess of 80 MW.”).
155. Id.
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and how this request for QF status substantially differed from
past approvals. Yet, after evaluating the order and FERC’s
justifications, it is clear that the Commission’s efforts to
distinguish the facility from those granted QF status in the past
were flawed. Compare Broadview Solar’s analysis with the
treatment of the “power production capacity” question as
addressed in the three cases FERC relied on in its decision.156 As
discussed in Part I, FERC’s order in Occidental Geothermal
evaluated various alternative interpretations of “power
production capacity,” and provided support for why the resulting
net output determination was preferable.157 While certainly not
exhaustive, FERC provided reasoned analysis of the two most
apt alternatives—the facility’s nominal rating and individual
component nominal rating.158 Additionally, Occidental
Geothermal established net output as power production capacity
only months after FERC promulgated rules implementing
PURPA and only two years after Congress enacted it.159 That
Commission was arguably in the best position to determine
Congressional intent and the goals to be achieved with the
legislation.160 As further demonstration of the Commission’s
concern with the goals to be achieved by PURPA, FERC
referenced the Conference Report attached to the Act as
guidance for the Commission’s ultimate decision in Occidental
Geothermal.161
The other two orders cited by the Commission in Broadview
Solar, and detailed in Part I of this Note, demonstrate how
FERC historically relied on prior QF status adjudications to
guide its decision-making. In Malacha Power, the Commission
utilized past precedent to assess whether interconnection

156. Compare id. at ¶ 62,275–76, with Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17
FERC ¶ 61,231, 61,445 (1981), and Malacha Power Project, Inc., 41 FERC ¶
61,350, 61,946–47 (1987), and Am. Ref-Fuel Co. of Bergen County, 54 FERC ¶
61,287, 61,817–18 (1991).
157. See Occidental Geothermal, 17 FERC at ¶ 61,444–45; see also supra
Part I.C.
158. See Occidental Geothermal, 17 FERC at ¶ 61,444–45.
159. See id. at ¶ 61,445; supra Parts I.B, I.C.
160. As discussed in Part I, Congress was responding to an unprecedented
energy crisis. It stands to reason FERC was aware of the goals of the legislation.
See supra Part I.A.
161. See Occidental Geothermal, 17 FERC at ¶ 61,444 (“The Conference
Report accompanying PURPA indicates that the power production capacity of
the facility is its ‘rated capacity.’”).
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equipment is part of a QF.162 FERC analyzed the reasoning
provided in two contemporary orders regarding interconnection
equipment and utilized that guidance to justify its decision to
place sizable interconnection equipment on the QF side of the
exchange.163 While this decision expanded the scope of QF
qualifying criteria and increased the amount of auxiliary load
that could be deducted, FERC did so by analyzing and following
the cited precedent.164 Last, in American Ref-Fuel, the
Commission again turned to its own historical approach to the
eighty MW threshold and the goals of PURPA to explain its
decision.165 By comparing two past applications for QF status,
one granted and one denied, FERC demonstrated through its
analysis why it decided to establish a one-hour period to average
net output.166 Further, the Commission discussed the goals of
PURPA and current industry practice.167
Contrary to these examples, ones FERC itself cited in its
order, the Commission did not perform a reasoned analysis
comparing the facts of Broadview’s facility with those facilities
that were previously granted QF status.168 Instead, FERC
merely relied on conclusory language. For instance, FERC stated
that “[u]tilizing inverters to limit the output of an otherwise
above-80 MW power production facility to 80 MW is, we believe,
inconsistent with the type of facility that Congress specified can
qualify as a small power production facility (i.e., a facility sized
80 MW or less).”169 But the Commission did not state why.170
162. See Malacha Power Project, Inc., 41 FERC ¶ 61,350, 61,945–46 (1987).
163. See id. at ¶ 61,946 (“The fact that Malacha’s interconnection equipment
will not be used for the transmission of ‘back-up power’ from an electric utility
to the facility does not contradict the precedent established in Clarion and
Sycamore. Thus, we conclude that Malacha’s interconnection equipment is part
of the facility.”).
164. See id. at ¶ 61,945–46.
165. See American Ref-Fuel Co. of Bergen County, 54 FERC ¶ 61,287,
61,817–18 (1991).
166. See id. (analyzing Massachusetts Refusetech, Inc., 25 FERC ¶ 61,406
(1983) and Coso Finance Partners (Navy I Facility), 50 FERC ¶ 62,154 (1990)).
167. See id. at ¶ 61,817 n.7 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 35.13(h)(27) (1990)).
168. See Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,275–76 (2020).
169. Id. at ¶ 62,276.
170. FERC does reference line 7a of Form No. 556 to demonstrate there is
no mention of inverters or “other output limiting devices,” but does not explain
why this FERC-instituted form is dispositive, or even evidence, of its conclusion.
Id.; see 18 C.F.R. § 131.80(a) (2021) (“Any person seeking to certify a facility as
a qualifying facility pursuant to sections 3(17) or 3(18) of the Federal Power
Act, 16 U.S.C. 796(3)(17), (3)(18), unless otherwise exempted or granted
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This failure to adequately provide a reasoned analysis is the
hallmark of arbitrary and capricious agency action.171
The likelihood of the order being found arbitrary and
capricious almost certainly played a large part in FERC’s
decision to reconsider. In the Broadview Rehearing order, the
Commission briefly summarized Broadview’s arguments, the
first of which is that “the Commission failed to provide a
principled explanation for overturning the Commission’s
longstanding ‘send out’ analysis of ‘power production
capacity[]’ . . . .”172 This focus on Broadview’s argument towards
the arbitrary and capricious nature of FERC’s decision, and the
lack of any refutation of those arguments, demonstrates the
Commission found at least some merit in those assertions.
2. The Proposed Facility’s Design Is Consistent with Previously
Approved QFs
As further evidence of FERC’s failure to contemporaneously
provide a reason for its ultimate decision, it did not attempt to
distinguish the facts of the prior orders discussed above with the
Broadview Solar facility to demonstrate how the proposed QF is
a deviation.173 The Commission itself, in Broadview Rehearing,
recognized that an application of the facts in those prior orders
proves that the Broadview facility conforms to the statute’s size
limitation.174 The cases cited in Broadview Solar support a
determination that certification of the Broadview Solar facility
as a QF is consistent with the longstanding approach taken by
a waiver by Commission rule or order pursuant to § 292.203(d), must complete
and file the Form of Certification of Qualifying Facility (QF) Status for a Small
Power Production or Cogeneration Facility, FERC Form No. 556.”).
171. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 48–49 (1983) (“There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the
choice made, no indication of the basis on which the [agency] exercised its expert
discretion. We are not prepared to and the Administrative Procedure Act will
not permit us to accept such . . . practice . . . . Expert discretion is the lifeblood
of the administrative process, but unless we make the requirements for
administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern
government, can become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its
discretion.” (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
167 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
172. Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199, 61,796 (2021).
173. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 22,275–77.
174. Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC at ¶ 61,799 (“Based on the analysis
above, we conclude that Broadview’s facility will conform to the size limit for a
qualifying small power production facility established in PURPA and the
Commission’s regulations.”).
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the Commission, not just regarding the definition of net output,
but also with regard to the policy implications behind the
decisions.
To illustrate this point, an evaluation of Malacha Power and
American Ref-Fuel show that both include specific facts that are
sufficiently similar to elements of the design of the Broadview
facility, or are possible to extrapolate to analogize, that
demonstrate why FERC’s initial holding was unsupported and
erroneous, and that its recent decision to set aside that holding
is appropriate. Malacha Power and American Ref-Fuel help
explain the inaccuracy in FERC’s assertion that there is a
fundamental difference between incidentally crossing the eighty
MW threshold and the pre-inverter 160 MW design of the
Broadview facility. Further, they show that FERC’s reliance on
the use of inverters as the crux of its argument is misplaced.
As evidence of this, one need only look to Malacha Power’s
request to include interconnection equipment as part of the
facility in order to subtract load losses.175 The equipment FERC
determined as auxiliary, and therefore part of the facility, was
substantial.176 It included “a powerhouse substation” with a
step-up transformer near the generation plant, another “minisubstation” with another step-up transformer near the point of
interconnection with the utility, and the eighteen miles of
transmission line stretched between them.177 Even more apt, the
QF’s net output at the facility exceeded the statutory threshold,
but due to load losses at the two substations and over the length
of eighteen miles of line, the net output at the point of
interconnection was exactly at the threshold.178 Malacha Power
is thus important as an example of the way FERC interprets not
just threshold issues, but more fundamental issues such as what
175. See Malacha Power Project, Inc., 41 FERC ¶ 61,350, 61,945-46 (1987).
176. See id. at ¶ 61,946.
177. Id. (“The interconnection equipment includes: (1) a powerhouse
substation that will contain a 13.8/115 kV delta/grounded-wye transformer
rated 21/28/35 MVA OA/FA/FOA at 65 degree C located near the powerhouse of
the facility; (2) a 17.9-mile 115 kV transmission line with 477 MCM 18/1 strand
ACSR conductors; and (3) a ‘mini-substation’ that will contain a 115/230 kV
delta/grounded-wye transformer rated 21/28/35 MVA OA/FA/FOA at 65 degree
C located at PG&E’s Pit No. 1 substation.”).
178. See id. Malacha Power involved a threshold of thirty MW, which under
PURPA allows the QF to avoid regulations under the Federal Power Act and
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act. Id. at ¶ 61,946_47. Despite the
different threshold and specific provision in Malacha Power, the analysis is
applicable and analogous to the eighty MW threshold of PURPA.
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the term facility encompasses. By considering this equipment to
be auxiliary components of the QF, FERC created two general
presumptions. The first is that equipment needed to provide
usable energy to the point of interconnection is part of the
facility.179 The second is that PURPA is only concerned with the
amount of energy at the point of interconnection.180
Compare this classification and treatment of auxiliary
equipment to that of the inverters in Broadview Solar.181 FERC
determined, without analysis or discussion, that limiting output
with inverters to meet the eighty MW limit was not consistent
with Congressional intent.182 But the inverters do not artificially
throttle down the amount of electricity to maintain compliance
with PURPA’s threshold requirement.183 Instead, they are
“integral component[s] of the facility” that convert DC electricity
produced by the solar array or held in the onsite battery storage
to AC electricity.184 Without the inverters, the facility simply
cannot get the DC power it generates onto the AC power grid.
Conversely, in Malacha Power, FERC concluded that it must
consider the substantial interconnection equipment as part of
the QF because they were necessary for the power produced to
be integrated onto the grid; a conclusion that was supported by
the Commission’s analysis of prior QF adjudications.185
179. See id. at ¶ 61,946 (“[W]e find that when the interconnection equipment
is part of the qualifying facility, the electric power production capacity of the
facility is the capacity that the electric power production equipment delivers to
the point of interconnection with the purchasing electric utility’s transmission
system.”).
180. See id. (“Should the facility’s power output at the point of
interconnection exceed 30 MWs, then under section 292.601 of our
regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 292.601 (1987), the Federal Power Act and/or the Public
Utility Holding Company Act will apply to all future transactions.” (emphasis
added)).
181. Compare id. at ¶ 61,945–46, with Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶
61,194, 62,276 (2020) (“We find that Broadview cannot meet the statutory limit
by relying on inverters as a limiting element on a QF’s output.”).
182. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,276 (“Utilizing inverters to
limit the output of an otherwise above-80 MW power production facility to 80
MW is, we believe, inconsistent with the type of facility that Congress specified
can qualify as a small power production facility (i.e., a facility sized 80 MW or
less).”).
183. Id. at ¶ 62,277, 62, 277 n.67 (Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).
184. Id. at ¶. 62,274, 62,277; PAUL DENHOLM, JOSH EICHMAN, & ROBERT
MARGOLIS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB’Y, EVALUATING THE TECHNICAL
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF PV PLUS STORAGE POWER PLANTS 3 (2017)
(describing the role of inverters in PV plus storage systems).
185. See Malacha Power, 41 FERC at ¶ 61,946.

2022]

A BROAD VIEW OF BROADVIEW SOLAR

395

American Ref-Fuel is helpful when evaluating the design of
the Broadview Solar facility and FERC’s prior interpretation of
the policy behind PURPA. FERC acknowledged in its American
Ref-Fuel order that intermittent heat spikes due to inconsistent
fuel source could cause exceedances of the eighty MW threshold,
and so accepted an averaged net output period of sixty
minutes.186 The facility operator admitted that it could always
maintain an output of less than eighty MW at the expense of
wasted energy.187 FERC stated it will “tak[e] into account the
technical realities of the industry” and that “[u]se of the 60minute interval will thus eliminate any potential for abuse while
avoiding the systematic undersizing and underutilization of
small power production facilities approaching the 80-MW
limitation.”188 American Ref-Fuel demonstrates FERC’s
commitment to ensuring a facility can maintain a net power
output at the eighty MW threshold.
Contrast FERC’s analysis of, and flexibility surrounding,
the limitations placed on output capabilities in American RefFuel with the assertion in Broadview Solar that “Broadview
cannot meet the statutory limit by relying on inverters as a
limiting element on a QF’s output.”189 American Ref-Fuel
demonstrates that this approach is not only inconsistent with
past application approvals but is a fundamental shift in how
FERC interprets PURPA. American Ref-Fuel shows a FERC
concerned with developing methodologies that allow maximum
net output to ensure as much QF power as possible is utilized.190
Now, FERC argues that PURPA cannot abide a facility with a
160 MW solar array, despite its output being firmly capped at
eighty MW.191
What may have been most troubling about FERC’s
reasoning is that even if, arguendo, the 160 MW solar array is
distinguishable from the technologies considered in FERC’s
186. See American Ref-Fuel Co. of Bergen County, 54 FERC ¶ 61,287,
61,817–18 (1991).
187. See id. at ¶ 61,817 (“Ref-Fuel admits that it could maintain a more
stringent standard to provide a margin for generation variations, but at the
expense of wasted steam, below design level operations, increased use of
alternative fossil fuel generation, and decreased incineration of
environmentally undesirable solid waste.”).
188. Id. at ¶ 61,817–18.
189. Compare id., with Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,276.
190. See American Ref-Fuel, 54 FERC at ¶ 61,818.
191. See Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,276 (2020).
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prior QF applications, there is still no functional difference
between the ability to maintain an averaged constant of eighty
MW per hour, such as in American Ref-Fuel, and maintaining an
actual eighty MW constant using inverters. This is an important
issue because of another point the Commission made in
American Ref-Fuel—that it will look at the technical realities of
the industry.192 The technical reality in American Ref-Fuel was
an inconsistent fuel source that led to frequent spikes in net
output.193 In the case of the Broadview Solar facility, that
technical reality is also the variable nature of the fuel source.
Most renewable energy resources, including solar power
systems, exhibit wide-ranging output variations.194 This
variability imposes unique challenges on facility design.
For example, if a solar array were built to a maximum
output of eighty MW, it would rarely, if ever, be able to generate
to its full capacity.195 In this scenario, the intermittency of the
solar fuel source would not cause peaks over the eighty MW
threshold, like in American Ref-Fuel, but would instead result in
a consistent underperformance. To mitigate this, the technologybased solution—the technological reality of the industry FERC
stated it should consider—is to overbuild solar arrays and pair
them with battery storage.196 Overbuilding reduces the output
192. See American Ref-Fuel, 54 FERC at ¶ 61,817 (“We will employ the same
flexible approach here, taking into account the technical realities of the
industry.”).
193. See id. at ¶ 61,817 (“According to Ref-Fuel, its facility is designed to
produce a net output of 80 MW. Because of the substantial variation in the heat
content of solid waste, however, the net output of the facility often will exceed
this level.”). This unpredictability resulted in heat spikes, which in turn
resulted in frequent electricity spikes and generation in excess of eighty MW.
See id. at ¶ 61,816. FERC recognized that the heat content of its primary fuel
source was unpredictable. See id. at ¶ 61,817.
194. See Suberu et al., supra note 11, at 500 (“Though renewable energy
sources (RES) are inexhaustible in quantity . . . they are characterized with
fluctuating power output as commonly observed in wind, tidal wave and solar
power systems.”).
195. See Angel Antonio Bayod-Rújula, Chapter 8 – Solar Photovoltaics (PV),
in SOLAR HYDROGEN PRODUCTION: PROCESSES, SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGIES
291–95 (Francesco Calise et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the various losses and
inefficiencies inherent in any photovoltaic panel preventing full compliance
with the nominal nameplate power rating).
196. Cf. Micah S. Ziegler et al., supra note 139, at 2137 (“[F]or higher storage
energy capacity costs, it is less expensive to install more renewables generation
than to increase storage capacity, even if this leads to the renewables plant
generating energy that is in excess of the energy used as baseload, intermediate,
bipeaker, or peaker output.”).
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fluctuations by creating a steady supply of power.197 Not only is
this beneficial to the QF, which is no longer as dependent on
favorable weather conditions to maximize output, but it also
supports the core concern of grid reliability.198
The facility’s use of inverters, then, conveys a secondary
benefit. While their primary function is to physically convert DC
power to AC power to allow it to enter the grid,199 an added
benefit is their ability to ensure compliance with the eighty MW
limit by allowing the facility to overbuild to overcome the
technological limitations of the equipment.200 Instead of relying
on an artificial, averaged net output period to meet the statutory
threshold, the Broadview facility maintains actual compliance
with the net output limitation.201 Given this similarity of facts,
and in many cases more stringent technological controls in place,
it is difficult to reconcile the lenience and acquiescence FERC
demonstrated in American Ref-Fuel in pursuit of PURPA’s goals
with the decision made in Broadview Solar.
This Note contrasts these cases cited within FERC’s
Broadview Solar order with the outcome then reached by the
Commission to show that the proposed facility is not an
aberration or an attempt to circumvent PURPA in bad faith. The
facility designers instead relied on the last forty years of
precedent to develop a system that will maintain as close to
eighty MW output as possible, without being capable of
exceeding that threshold. In Broadview Rehearing, FERC
recognized this intent to maximize output and affirmed that the
197. See id. (“These systems have . . . an equivalent availability factor (EAF)
of 100%, meaning that the output shape is met during 100% of the hours
simulated.”).
198. See Suberu et al., supra note 11, at 501 (“An [energy storage system]
can offer dependability to renewable resources because intermittent sources of
energy have multiple effects on the operational security, stability, reliability
and efficiency of power systems.”).
199. Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,277, 62,277 n.67 (2020)
(Glick, Comm’r, dissenting).
200. Cf. id. at ¶ 62,277, 62,277 n.68 (Glick, Comm’r., dissenting) (“Instead of
increasing the power production capacity of Broadview’s facility, the large solar
array enhances its capacity factor, meaning that the facility will, all else equal,
generate a higher fraction of its total 80 MW capacity than it would with a
smaller array. That makes the system more efficient—a result I would have
thought the Commission would be eager to encourage.”).
201. See id. at ¶ 62,277 (“The bottom line is that while Broadview’s
configuration may allow it to more predictably produce electricity, that
configuration does not give it a power production capacity greater than 80
MW.”).
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proposed facility complies with the holdings in Occidental
Geothermal, Malacha Power, and American Ref-Fuel and the
eighty MW size limit in PURPA.202 Further, FERC addresses
some of the issues discussed herein, such as granting approval
for the use of inverters and considering them part of the “solar
PV facility’s generation equipment . . . necessary to produce
power in a form useful to the interconnecting utility.”203 The
Commission concluded its analysis by stating that
Although Broadview’s configuration allows it to more consistently
deliver a higher share of the 80 MW power production capacity, that
configuration does not change the fact that the Broadview facility is
not actually capable of providing more than 80 MW at any one point in
time at its point of interconnection with NorthWestern. On
reconsideration, we find that while this effectively increases the
Broadview facility’s capacity factor, it does not change the Broadview
facility’s “power production capacity” or call into question our
longstanding reliance on the “send out” analysis to measure power
production capacity.204

FERC correctly accepted that PURPA set an upper limit on
power production capacity and FERC’s subsequent regulations
and orders developed generous boundaries and flexible rules to
define that term and encourage the inclusion of QF resources in
support of PURPA’s goals.205 This conclusion, and the act of
setting aside the September order, not only correctly verifies the
Broadview facility’s status in a way that is justified by the
statute and the overall goal of PURPA, but also avoids raising
serious policy issues and real consequences.
B. THE AVOIDED POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND POSITIVE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE BROADVIEW SAGA
Broadview Solar’s lack of significant legal justification for
altering the longstanding meaning of “power production
capacity” introduced immense uncertainty and could have led to
consequences far beyond the denial of one facility’s application.
Although FERC avoided these consequences by setting aside the
Broadview Solar order, this section provides an analysis of the
outcomes the order could have caused to provide a background
for why the D.C. Circuit should affirm Broadview Rehearing.

202.
203.
204.
205.

Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199, 61,797–99 (2021).
Id. at ¶ 61,799.
Id.
See supra Part I.C.
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The first of those potential consequences, as detailed in the
dissent, was the immediate impact on facilities seeking QF
status and the upsetting of settled law.206 The second, and more
nefarious, was the broad new authority the majority order
attempted to create. The September decision functionally
expanded FERC’s power by granting it permission to overturn
longstanding precedent without a substantive discussion or
meaningful countervailing evidence against the former
interpretation, and without either formal or informal
rulemaking procedures. The ability to overturn past decisions is
plainly within FERC’s authority, but to do so without a clear
explanation for why is not only impermissible under the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review but is also
intolerable if there is hope of maintaining any industry-wide
reliance on FERC precedent. The third consequence was an
undermining of legislative intent that weakens an important
statute.
Looking beyond Broadview Solar and the avoided outcomes
of the abandoned order, FERC’s decision in Broadview
Rehearing helps remove barriers to entry for proposed QFs that
incorporate hybrid renewable energy plus batter storage and
maximize generation potential. This expansion of PURPA’s
effectiveness is most important in regions without a competitive
wholesale market, such as the American Southeast and much of
the West where fossil-fuel generation remains a significant
source of generation.207
1. Broadview Solar Unnecessarily Disturbed Settled Law
FERC’s decision to overturn four decades of precedent
unnecessarily introduced uncertainty into an area of longsettled law. Commissioner Glick was the first to point this out in

206. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,278 (Glick, Comm’r.,
dissenting) (“I cannot help but express my concern that so casually upending
settled precedent creates unnecessary uncertainty, making it hard for
developers to know which precedents they can count on and which they
cannot.”).
207. See, e.g., Florida: State Profile and Energy Estimates, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/state/data.php?sid=FL#SupplyDistribution
[https://perma.cc/67L3-FM3R] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (showing an 84.2%
fossil-fuel generation mix for the state); see Mississippi: State Profile and
Energy Estimates, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/state/data.php?sid=MS [https
://perma.cc/4DUZ-YAX2] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (showing an 82.4% fossilfuel generation mix for the state).
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a well-reasoned dissent accompanying the Commission’s
order.208 The uncertainty was further evidenced by the
shockwaves the order sent through the renewable energy
community. Industry news websites heavily reported on the
decision.209 Law firms created webpages to explain the
ramifications to their clients.210 Perhaps most telling, the Solar
Energy Industries Association (SEIA), as well as multiple
renewable power plant developers, moved for leave to intervene
in Broadview Solar’s request to FERC for rehearing.211 The solar
industry trade group was clear that it believed the Commission
dramatically overstepped by overturning precedent that the
industry relied on without a notice of proposed rulemaking or a

208. See Broadview Solar, 172 FERC at ¶ 62,278 (Glick, Comm’r.,
dissenting) (“Nevertheless, in a break from precedent, today’s order denies
Broadview’s application for QF status.”).
209. See Jean Haggerty, FERC Adopts Big Utilities’ Narrative in PURPA
Ruling, PV MAG. (SEPT. 17, 2020), https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2020/09/17/fercadopts-big-utilities-narrative-in-purpa-ruling/; Lyle Larson & S. Michael
Madison, FERC Reconsiders QF Power Production Capacity Standard, JD
SUPRA (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ferc-reconsiders-qfpower-production-91214/; Catherine Morehouse, FERC Reverses 40 Years of
PURPA Precedent in Ruling on Small Solar Definition, Punts on Storage
Question, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/fercreverses-40-years-of-purpa-precedent-in-ruling-on-small-solar-definiti/585104;
Arianna Skibell, FERC’s ‘Surprise’ PURPA Order Enrages Solar Industry,
ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/106371
5443/.
210. See Scott Daniel Johnson, Divided FERC Abandons Long-Standing
Precedent for Determining QF Capacity, AKIN GUMP (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://www.akingump.com/en/experience/industries/energy/speakingenergy/divided-ferc-abandons-long-standing-precedent-for-determining-qfcapacity.html; Sidney Villanueva & Russell Kooistra, FERC and Montana
Supreme Court Issuances Bring Big Regulatory Shakeups to the PURPA
Regulatory Landscape, TROUTMAN PEPPER: WASH. ENERGY REP. (Sept. 10,
2020), https://www.troutmanenergyreport.com/2020/09/ferc-and-montana-supr
eme-court-issuances-bring-big-regulatory-shakeups-to-the-purpa-regulatorylandscape/; FERC’s Broadview Solar Order Has Major Implications for Solar
QFs and Utilities Implementing PURPA, MCGUIRE WOODS (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2020/9/fercs-broadview
-solar-order; FERC News for Renewables: Power Production Capacity
Calculation for Qualifying Facilities, PORTER WRIGHT (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.porterwright.com/media/ferc-news-for-renewables-powerproduction-capacity-calculation-for-qualifying-facilities/.
211. Motion for Leave to Intervene Out of Time by the Solar Energy Indus.
Ass’n at 1, Broadview Solar, LLC, No. QF17-545-004 (FERC Sept. 28, 2020)
[hereinafter Motion for Leave to Intervene]; see also Broadview Rehearing, 174
FERC ¶ 61,199, 61,792 n.5 (2021).
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comment period.212 SEIA’s motion illustrates the uncertainty
injected into the industry, stating that “[t]his new interpretation
affects not only Broadview Solar but extends to each and every
Qualifying Facility that the Commission has, or will, certify.”213
While FERC attempted to assuage fears by stating all QFs prior
to the date of the Broadview Solar order would be
“grandfathered” in, the order still created substantial ambiguity
even for established QFs.214 What if there is an ownership
change and the QF must apply for recertification? What if there
are upgrades at a facility that increase the gross output, but net
output stays the same? What if net output increases? The list of
unanswered questions created by the order would have ensured
costly future litigation surrounding an issue that was wellestablished, to say nothing of the financial impact that would
have been incurred by any developers who were in the process of
constructing, negotiating, or planning a facility that no longer
fell within QF parameters.
2. Broadview Solar Threatened Procedural Due Process and
Separation of Powers
The order did more, however, than unsettle the
interpretation of power production capacity. The order
challenged notions of due process within the administrative
state. Without even considering the legal shortcomings
discussed above in Part II.A, the process by which FERC reached
its decision was troubling and posed significant questions
regarding agency power. The Commission did not utilize any
formal or informal rulemaking procedures, and instead raised
the issue during what should have been a routine QF application
approval process.215 SEIA, in its own petition to the D.C. Circuit
for review of the Commission’s decision in Broadview Solar, also

212. See Motion for Leave to Intervene, supra note 211, at 3 (“[T]he
Commission went far beyond issuing case-specific findings about the Qualifying
Facility proposed by Broadview Solar and – without notice – overturned forty
years of precedent about how to interpret a key provision of PURPA.”).
213. Id.
214. Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,276 (2020).
215. See Motion for Leave to Intervene, supra note 211, at 3 (“Given that the
Commission opened a rulemaking docket after the Broadview Solar docket was
initiated, and the Commission never provided any indication that it was
considering revising its rules for determining the ‘power production capacity’ of
a Qualifying Facility, 2 SEIA had good cause for failing to file a motion to
intervene in this proceeding prior to September 1, 2020.”).

402

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

raised as a concern that FERC’s decision was made sua sponte
in an individual adjudicatory proceeding.216 This point was well
made. Fundamentally changing the approach to the eighty MW
threshold in a QF status adjudication was a stunning decision
for FERC to make, given the rote, procedural nature of a QF
application. In fact, if FERC followed Occidental Geothermal’s
precedent, there is nothing in the order to indicate the proposed
facility would be denied QF status.217 Even if it were denied,
there was surely no suggestion FERC was considering taking a
new look at the established definition of power production
capacity; a definition in place for forty years. The implication of
this is that FERC attempted to assert legislative control during
a routine adjudication and make policy decisions without notice,
without accepting comments from impacted parties, and without
the procedural due process required under the Administrative
Procedure Act.218
Another concern raised by the order was the upending of an
interpretation that was ratified by Congressional inaction for a
new interpretation that thwarts the goals of PURPA.219
216. Petition for Review at 2–3, Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n v. FERC, No. 20–
1500 at 2 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 14, 2020).
217. See generally Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194 (2020).
218. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2018) (“A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
219. The U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally held that Congressional
inaction in the face of an agency interpretation is an indication of agreement
and ratification of that interpretation. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574, 599 (1982) (“It is, of course, not unknown for independent agencies
or the Executive Branch to misconstrue the intent of a statute; Congress can
and often does correct such misconceptions, if the courts have not done so . . . .
Failure of Congress to modify the [agency] rulings . . . when enacting other and
related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative
acquiescence in and ratification by implication.”); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell,
456 U.S. 512, 534 (1982) (“[T]he postenactment [sic] history of Title IX does
indicate that Congress was made aware of the Department’s interpretation of
the Act and of the controversy surrounding the regulations governing
employment, and it lends weight to the argument that coverage of employment
discrimination was intended.”); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)
(“[R]egulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change,
applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have
received congressional approval and have the effect of law”); United States v.
Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 466 (1933) (“The administrative
construction must be deemed to have received legislative approval by the
reenactment of the statutory provision, without material change.”); cf. Nat’l
Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 993 (2005)
(explaining that there is a “presumption that Congress is aware of ‘settled
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Evaluating the Broadview Solar decision against the historical
backdrop of PURPA and the goals it was designed to achieve, it
is difficult to see how FERC’s decision was in accordance with
the guiding statute.220 While the energy landscape has changed
significantly since Congress enacted PURPA in 1978, the core
purpose of the law—to promote conservation and incorporate
more renewable energy on the grid—is as important as ever.221
The world faces a massive and unprecedented climate crisis.222
It is the current scientific consensus that “human activities,
especially emissions of greenhouse gases, are the dominant
cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.”223
Electricity generation is the second largest contributor of
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, responsible for
25% of the nation’s total in 2019.224 Despite global efforts to
judicial and administrative interpretation[s]’ of terms when it enacts a statute”)
(citing Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Industries Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159 (1993)).
For an explanation of Congressional ratification through reenactment as a rule
of statutory interpretation, see LARRY M. EIG, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS 51 (2014) (“If Congress reenacts a statute and leaves unchanged a
provision that had received a definitive administrative or judicial
interpretation, the Court sometimes holds that Congress has ratified that
interpretation.”).
220. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018) (setting forth the findings of Congress in
enacting PURPA); Small Power Production and Cogeneration Facilities—
Qualifying Status, 45 Fed. Reg. 17959, 17959 (Mar. 20, 1980) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 292).
221. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2018) (“[A] program providing for increased
conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and
resources by electric utilities . . . [and] to provide for the expeditious
development of hydroelectric potential . . . ”); 45 Fed. Reg. 17959, 17959
(identifying the purpose of PURPA to be to prescribe rules under which small
power production facilities (defined as facilities which produce electric energy
solely by using renewable resources) and cogeneration facilities can obtain
“qualifying” status).
222. See also MARK JACOBSON, 100% CLEAN, RENEWABLE ENERGY AND
STORAGE FOR EVERYTHING 10 (2020) (explaining that the financial impact of
climate change is projected to reach between “$25 and $30 trillion per year by
2050” (emphasis added)). See generally U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH
PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT, VOLUME I (2017) (providing an assessment of the causes of
anthropogenic climate change, the measurable effects so far incurred, and
projections of future impacts).
223. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 222, at 10.
224. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Overview, EPA, https://www
.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions#:~:text=Electricity
%20production%20(26.9%20percent%20of,mostly%20coal%20and%20natural%
20gas [https://perma.cc/UZG5-HVF5] (last updated July 27, 2021).
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address the warming of the planet, “continued growth of global
fossil CO2 emissions” is still occurring.225 This increase is seen
by many as a failure to utilize “the full bag of policy options.”226
Not only did FERC not utilize the full bag of options, in this case,
it opened up the bag and threw away some tools. As
demonstrated in Part I.A and I.B, a decision such as this would
have been an obstacle to the very purpose of PURPA.227
Functionally, FERC legislated away the core purpose of PURPA
and raised separation of powers concerns.
Broadview Rehearing does not address these major
administrative agency authority considerations beyond setting
aside the order.228 Other than a brief sentence that states
“Broadview argues that the Commission failed to provide a
principled explanation for overturning the Commission’s
longstanding ‘send out’ analysis of ‘power production capacity,’”
FERC does not attempt to explain away or grapple with the
errors made under the APA.229 Instead, FERC focused on
performing statutory analysis and evaluating the core earlier
proceedings.230
Although this explanation is appropriate and convincing, as
elaborated on above at great length, FERC missed an
opportunity to further discuss why its prior order was
noncompliant with the APA. The disruption of settled law, the
due process concerns, and the separation of powers issues raised
by Broadview Solar are some of the most troubling aspects of
that initial decision. FERC’s clearly stated refutation of the
unreasoned order could have assuaged any concerns about
agency overreach. Further, as Broadview Rehearing is heard
before the D.C. Circuit, an on the record discussion in the
agency’s own words that expresses a belief that the prior order
was arbitrary and capricious and invoked major administrative
state concerns would speak volumes. Unfortunately, FERC
chose to go in another direction. For example, in denying the
225. G.P. Peters et al., Carbon Dioxide Emissions Continue to Grow Amidst
Slowly Emerging Climate Policies, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 3, 6 (2020).
226. Id. (“Public policies need to place far more importance on directly
cutting back the use of fossil fuels or removing their emissions through CCS,
particularly the phasing out of coal power plants . . . .”).
227. See supra Part I.A, I.B.
228. See generally Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2021) (setting
aside the September 2020 Order).
229. Id. at ¶ 61,795.
230. Id. at ¶ 61,796–800.
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trade groups and renewable developers motions to intervene out
of time, FERC again turned to the size of the facility and its
battery storage component as evidence.231 This time, FERC
argued that these parties should have been on notice that this
otherwise routine QF application could affect their interests
because of the unique design of the facility.232 By making this
argument, FERC distances itself from the suggestion that its
procedure was an aberration or that it implicated reliance
interests without the ability for those interests to have a say.
3. Broadview Rehearing Removes Barriers to Renewable
Energy Integration
Not to be lost in these considerations of legal upheaval and
expansion of agency authority is the real and negative impact
Broadview Solar would have had on renewable energy
integration and battery storage adoption, and how Broadview
Rehearing not only cast aside the earlier order, but also
expanded the scope of QF status for hybrid facilities. FERC’s
initial overhaul of the eighty MW threshold would have severely
limited the economic incentive of building new QFs, which in
turn makes it more difficult to integrate renewable energy onto
the grid, particularly in regions of the United States that are
currently underserved by renewable energy generation. Where
it was once treated as a flexible standard designed to incorporate
renewable technologies to serve the guiding principles of
PURPA, the power production capacity threshold was turned
into a barrier.
As discussed in Part I, overbuilding renewable generation
serves as a cost cutting measure necessary to make these
facilities economically viable.233 For the purpose of QFs,
overbuilding is perhaps best demonstrated by the proposed QF
in Broadview Solar.234 The 160 MW solar array can generate
electricity in excess of the eighty MW that the inverters can

231. Id. at ¶ 61,794–95.
232. See id. at ¶ 61,795 (“We are not persuaded by the claim that the
movants had inadequate notice that the outcome of this proceeding could affect
their interests. Broadview proposed a facility with a 160 MW solar PV array
(and also a 200 MWh battery energy storage facility) and noted its reliance on
Occidental in its application.”).
233. See supra Part I.F; see also Ziegler et al., supra note 139 and
accompanying text.
234. Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,272–73 (2020).
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convert.235 Any additional generation is then directed to the
battery storage.236 The benefit to overbuilding and
overgeneration is that with battery storage, this excess is not
wasted.237 Instead, it is stored for periods of low generation, such
as at night for solar and on calm days for wind.238 Economically
speaking, this overgeneration and storage combination can
ensure output during periods when the facility would normally
not be producing.239 This could be the factor that takes a facility
from loss to profit. Consider a solar facility in the winter in a
nevertheless sunny locale. With shorter days and longer nights,
the solar facility is not selling any power for twelve to fourteen
hours.240 This is a substantial period to be idle. Given that some
states’ avoided cost rates for QFs are seeing persistent
reductions in recent years,241 the loss of revenue during the long
nights can be the death knell for many facilities operating on
slim margins. By continuing output during those periods with
battery storage, the facility increases both its own fiscal recovery
while mitigating the substantial swings in power on the grid,
thereby increasing reliability.
Given this economic reality, FERC’s decision in Broadview
Rehearing acts to not only return to an interpretation that
encourages renewable adoption, but also expands the potential
for the deployment of battery storage in non-RTO/ISO regions.

235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See ASIAN DEV. BANK, HANDBOOK ON BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE
SYSTEM, at xiii (2018) (“The key to overcoming such challenges is to increase
power system flexibility so that the occasional periods of excessive renewable
power generation need not be curtailed . . . . Storage offers one possible source
of flexibility.”).
238. See id. at 24 (“[S]torage can provide similar time-shift duty by storing
excess energy production, which would otherwise be curtailed, from renewable
sources such as wind or photovoltaic.”).
239. Cf. id. (“Electric energy time-shift involves purchasing inexpensive
electric energy, available during periods when prices or system marginal costs
are low, to charge the storage system so that the stored energy can be used or
sold at a later time when the price or costs are high.”).
240. See Solar Power at the Arctic Circle, NORDIC ENERGY RES. (Oct. 18,
2011), https://www.nordicenergy.org/406rticle/solar-power-at-the-arctic-circle/
(“In spite of the high number of sun hours, high latitudes pose some challenges
for solar power. Nights are long in the winter, and in the summer the sun’s path
over the sky varies a lot.”).
241. See SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 49 (“In some states, we
have already seen . . . reductions in avoided cost rates (30 percent cut in
Montana).”).
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FERC’s most recent determination indicates that batteries will
be considered part of the QF, along with inverters, photovoltaic
panels, and other equipment on the facility side of the
interconnection.242 This decision ensures that future facilities
can pair renewable technology and storage in order to create
viable, carbon-free generation facilities that can better compete
with fossil fuel generation in geographic regions that need it
most. And while one technology will not be the total solution to
an overreliance on fossil-fuel electricity generation, battery
storage is showing tremendous promise as a technology that can
increase the reliability of renewable energy sources.243 As
discussed in Part I.G, battery storage is now technologically
capable of supplanting fossil-fuels for peak generation in
competitive wholesale markets, which is crucial to address the
emissions and climate change issues discussed above, as peak
generation causes more pollution than baseload fossil fuel
plants.244 The U.S. Energy Information Administration’s
projections for increased battery storage is desirable, but is
heavily dependent on the ability to accelerate the deployment of
renewable energy generation.245
This illustrates that further incorporation of renewable
energy is still a desirable policy forty years after the passage of
PURPA. The southeastern United States is underserved by
renewable energy generation.246 Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and a majority of
242. See Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199, 61,799 (2021) (“Because
Broadview’s facility—including the PV panels, inverters, and the battery
system—can deliver a maximum of 80 MW of power to NorthWestern’s system
at any one point in time, the power production capacity of Broadview’s facility
cannot and will not exceed 80 MW.”).
243. See Jahedul Islam Chowdhury et al., supra note 138, at 2 (“[Electrical
energy storage] offers many services, including micro-grid balancing,
residential and industrial load peak shaving, and power quality management
at the utility scale level; and voltage and frequency regulations, reduction of
transmission losses, improvement of system reliability, peak load management,
grid stabilization, electrical supply capacity and enhancing renewable
integration at the grid level.” (footnotes omitted)).
244. See supra Part I.F; see also MCNAMARA, supra note 135.
245. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 143, at 82 (“Storage growth
is stronger in [Annual Energy Outlook 2020] scenarios that have a high
penetration of renewables”).
246. See generally U.S. States: State Profiles and Energy Estimates, ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=US (last visited Jan. 30, 2020)
(providing an interactive map and data set tools to explore state-by-state energy
consumption by fuel source).
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Mississippi are not part of an RTO/ISO, so electricity is, put very
simply, generated, distributed, and sold by vertically integrated
utilities in monopolistic service areas.247 Because of this, the cost
to each utility of building renewable energy generation plants—
while a cheaper energy source in many circumstances than the
fossil-fuel generation predominant in the southeast248—often
exceeds the cost of continued reliance on natural gas and coal
generation from facilities that are already built.249 Florida,
Mississippi, and South Carolina are prime examples of this.
While the United States averages 20% electricity generation
from utility-scale renewable energy sources,250 Florida only
derives 4.6% of its power from renewables.251 Comparatively,
Mississippi comes in with 2.2% share of its supply from
renewable energy sources, while South Carolina can claim
7.0%.252 Without some form of incentivization, be it mandatory
RPS standards or the compulsory purchase requirement of
PURPA, this data makes clear that it is unlikely utilities in the
southeast will construct new renewable generation. FERC
managed to restore the best means of encouraging renewable
247. See U.S. Electricity Grid & Markets, supra note 45 (providing a map of
RTO/ISO service areas and the regions of the U.S. remaining vertically
integrated).
248. See Kathryn Parkman, Solar Energy vs. Fossil Fuels, CONSUMER AFFS.,
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/solar-energy/solar-vs-fossil-fuels.html (last
updated Oct. 10, 2021) (“Electricity from fossil fuels costs between 5 and 17
cents per kilowatt-hour. Solar energy costs average between 3 cents and 6 cents
per kilowatt-hour and are trending down . . . .”).
249. Compare Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 2020, INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/reports/projected-costs-of-generating-electricity2020 (last visited Nov. 25, 2021) (utilizing graphs by which a user can compare
the cost of construction of various forms of generation), with Electricity Data
Browser, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser
/#/topic/15?agg=1,0,2&fuel=1&geo=vvvvvvvvvvvvo&sec=80o&linechart=ELEC
.COST_BTU.NG-US-98.M&columnchart=ELEC.COST_BTU.NG-US-98.M&m
ap=ELEC.COST_BTU.NG-US-98.M&freq=M&start=200101&end=202011&ct
ype=linechart&ltype=pin&rtype=s&maptype=0&rse=0&pin= (last visited Jan.
30, 2020) (utilizing graphs to show average cost of natural gas delivered for
electricity generation).
250. Renewable Energy Explained, supra note 130.
251. Florida: State Profile and Energy Estimates, supra note 207 (examining
the utility-scale net electricity generation of renewables as a share of the total).
252. Mississippi: State Profile and Energy Estimates, supra note 207
(examining the utility-scale net electricity generation of renewables as a share
of the total); South Carolina: State Profile and Energy Estimates, ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/data.php?sid=SC [https://perma.cc/J6HYNQDU] (last updated Nov. 18, 2021) (examining the utility-scale net electricity
generation of renewables as a share of the total).
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development in the southeast by setting aside Broadview Solar
in full and further provided an incredible tool through its battery
storage determination that will help to make carbon-free and
renewable technology more competitive with fossil fuel
generation.
C. WHAT THE BROADVIEW SAGA ILLUSTRATES ABOUT FERC
The burning question raised by Broadview Solar and
Broadview Rehearing is what this process says about FERC as
an agency and as a policymaker. Is it fair to categorize these
events as a mistake and then a rectification? Was FERC simply
being responsive to overwhelming feedback it received in the
form of motions to intervene that caused it to take a harder look
at the issue? Or did the change in presidential administration or
Commission composition serve as the impetus to reevaluate?
The about-face, only a little over six months after the initial
decision, poses these and other questions that may shed some
light on FERC’s process. By examining the Commission’s
refutation of the September decision, the recent restructuring of
FERC’s leadership, and then-Commissioner Chatterjee’s swing
vote, it is possible to extrapolate some hypothesis about why
FERC set aside the Broadview Solar order and how this
Commission will address the changing energy landscape going
forward.
As discussed above, this issue was primed for a
reevaluation. All other considerations aside, the Broadview
Solar order was likely so lacking in reasoned explanation that it
would not have withstood judicial review even if the new
composition of the Commission so desired. Given these
fundamental flaws, coupled with the change in the Commission,
it is easy to attribute the rehearing and setting aside of the order
to a FERC that sought to avoid a defeat before the D.C. Circuit.
The likelihood of the order being overturned, however, cannot
fully explain the sudden reversal. If the Commission was
committed to this new interpretation, it certainly would have
made the best argument possible for such an outcome.
Further, it is not impossible for FERC to have succeeded
before the D.C. Circuit. Despite this Note’s focus on the reasons
the order was arbitrary and capricious, there may have been just
enough in the order to provide a sympathetic D.C. Circuit panel
the justification to come down on the side of the agency and
uphold the order. FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc. established that
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the agency does not need to prove the new interpretation is
actually better, only that the agency believes it will be better.253
FERC’s Broadview Solar order arguably did establish that the
Commission believed it was a better interpretation.254 And by
insisting that the interpretation is not retroactive, but will only
be applied going forward, it is possible FERC sidestepped the
issue of substantial reliance interests, limiting the claims of
reliance to any facilities currently under construction or deep in
the planning and financing stages.255
Given this possibility of success at the D.C. Circuit, even if
slim, it stands to reason there are other elements at play that
led to the reevaluation. One variable to consider is the
appointment of the new Commissioners. As mentioned, the
FERC that decided Broadview Rehearing is not the same FERC
that initially decided Broadview Solar. Commissioner Christie
and Commissioner Clements, one Republican and one Democrat
respectively, were appointed to the Commission at the end of
November of 2020.256 However, this change in the Commission’s
leadership is not necessarily dispositive as to why it would take
another look at the issue. After all, the two new Commissioners
were Trump Administration appointees,257 and their
appointments did not alter the Republican majority of the
Commission. In fact, in Broadview Rehearing, the new
Commissioners offset each other’s decisions, with Commissioner
Clements siding with the majority and Commissioner Christie
siding with Commissioner Danly in dissent.258 So while the fresh
lineup of the Commission almost certainly played a part in
FERC taking another look at the issue, it does not explain the
result. Instead, the result FERC arrived at was only possibly
253. See FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“But it need
not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy
are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is
permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the
agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately
indicates.”).
254. See Broadview Solar, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,194, 62,275–76 (2020).
255. See id. at ¶ 62,276.
256. See Press Release, supra note 115.
257. See Catherine Morehouse, Trump to Nominate Democratic, Republican
Appointees to FERC, UTIL. DIVE (July 27, 2020), https://www
.utilitydive.com/news/trump-nominates-democrat-republican-to-ferc/582392/
(discussing Trump’s two nominations to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission).
258. Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2021).
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because of Commissioner Chatterjee’s reconsideration of his
position on the issue and his agreement to certify the Broadview
facility as a QF.
The question is what inspired the change in Commissioner
Chatterjee’s thinking about the definition of power production
capacity. While some form of political pressure is an appealing
justification for Chatterjee’s swing vote, it is doubtful that it was
merely political leverage or influence that changed his stance.
FERC is an independent agency with only for-cause removal of
commissioners.259 Further, Chatterjee’s term was set to end on
June 30, 2021.260 There is very little leverage, at least in the
sense of Chatterjee’s current position, that the new
administration could exert on an independent commissioner.
These factors also counsel against political pressure from the
previous administration. While President Trump did have the
leverage to demote Chatterjee from the Chairman position,261 it
is quite clear that he lacked the cause to remove Chatterjee from
the Commission entirely. That is not to say politicization does
not or could not exist within the structure of FERC, or even that
it did not have a part to play here. But in the case of the
Broadview Saga it is likely not the largest or sole contributing
factor.
What then explains Commissioner Chatterjee’s change of
position and FERC’s setting aside of Broadview Solar? It is likely

259. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 786 T.1 (2013)
(listing agencies with statutory removal protection).
260. See Maya Weber & Ellie Potter, Chatterjee set to depart FERC on
Aug.30, leaving 2-2 voting split, S&P GLOBAL (Aug. 20, 2021), https://www.sp
global.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/082021-chatte
rjee-set-to-depart-ferc-on-aug-30-leaving-2-2-voting-split (“Chatterjee’s fouryear term officially expired on June 30, but he has continued to serve during
the last several weeks under the standard grace period designed to allow a
measure of continuity during commissioner turnover.”). Commissioner
Chatterjee stepped down from his position with FERC on August 30, 2021. See
Robert Walton, With FERC Now Split 2-2, Clean Energy Advocates
Call for Caution and Urgency to Fill Vacant Seat, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 3, 2021),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/with-ferc-now-split-2-2-clean-energyadvocates-call-for-caution-and-urgenc/606038/.
261. President Trump did eventually demote Chairman Chatterjee to
Commissioner Chatterjee on November 5, 2020, for “his unwillingness to go
along with the Trump administration’s governmentwide edicts against
diversity training.” Jeremy Dillon & Arianna Skibell, White House Demoted
Chatterjee over Diversity Training, E&E NEWS (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.ee
news.net/articles/white-house-demoted-chatterjee-over-diversity-training/.
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that Chatterjee, and through his deciding vote FERC, simply
recognized that the order was in error. Numerous petitions for
rehearing were submitted from solar developers and trade
groups.262 These petitions asserted arguments similar to the
ones discussed herein. It is probable that these arguments, to
put it very plainly, were compelling. Chatterjee explained during
the meeting in which Broadview Rehearing was decided that
“[i]t’s not simply a solar array that instantaneously injects every
megawatt it produces . . . [a]nd to treat it as such is an error.
Today’s order appropriately accounts for the configuration of this
hybrid facility, and creates a path forward for other projects that
may be similarly configured.”263 Although only so much can be
gleaned from a statement such as this, it does argue for the idea
that the information provided to the Commission was
convincing.
This speaks volumes about FERC and about the rehearing
process. Simply put, the Commission’s procedures for
reevaluating one of its decisions and the permissive quality of
section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act that permitted FERC to
set aside the order worked as intended.264 These measures
allowed FERC to evaluate the requests for rehearing despite
those requests having been procedurally denied, allowed the
agency the time necessary to reconsider its position, and allowed
the agency to set aside the prior order. This flexibility allowed
FERC in this case to avoid a costly appeal, at least for the time
being, but more importantly allowed the agency to utilize the
“full bag of policy options” available.265
This considered approach to energy policy generally, and
Commissioner Chatterjee’s reasoned reassessment specifically,
is convincing evidence FERC recognized the importance of
upholding the Congressional purpose of PURPA and the need to
rectify the Broadview Solar order. This should encourage the
D.C. Circuit Court to conclude that the FERC rehearing process
was an appropriate correction of its prior inconsistent order and

262. See Broadview Rehearing, 174 FERC at ¶ 61,792 n.5.
263. Catherine Morehouse, FERC Boosts Small Solar, Reversing PURPA
Ruling That Had Upended 40 Years of Precedent, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 19, 2021),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-boosts-small-solar-reversing-purparuling-that-had-upended-40-years-o/596997/.
264. See 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a) (2018).
265. See Peters et al., supra note 225, at 6.
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to uphold Broadview Rehearing on appeal as an appropriate
exercise of agency power in accordance with the law.
It appears FERC currently supports utilizing the statutory
tools currently in place to promote projects that develop
renewable energy generation and support the original goals of
PURPA. As Commissioner Clements succinctly summarized the
issue, “PURPA exists to encourage the construction of small
renewable energy and cogeneration facilities, and to create
competitive pressure for monopoly utilities, to the benefit of
customers . . . . To further these policy goals, it is important that
our policy clearly defines what facilities are eligible for
compensation under PURPA.”266
III. CONCLUSION
PURPA and its mandatory purchase requirement for QFgenerated power extracted America from a nation-defining
energy crisis. Over forty years later, PURPA is positioned to
provide a tried and tested tool in the response to a globe-defining
climate crisis by mandating the integration of renewable energy
resources onto the power grid. Although FERC briefly upended
the usefulness of PURPA when it unnecessarily redefined the
definition of power production capacity with its order in
Broadview Solar, the Commission rectified this error by setting
aside the order and reinstating the longstanding definition and
jurisprudence. By doing so, FERC provided a case from which it
is possible to theorize the factors that the agency looks to when
evaluating major decisions with immense policy implications.
Through these theorizations, the most supported conclusion is
that the independent agency in control of the nation’s energy
regulation is operating as designed and correcting its own
mistakes with a little help from impacted parties. In doing so,
FERC positions itself to be a supporter of the critically important
energy transition.

266. Morehouse, supra note 263.
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